SHELLENBERGER V. RANSOM ET AL.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

SHELLENBERGER v. RANSOM ET AL.
When a father conveys land in fee simple to his daughter, the title
begins with the daughter, and is not to be accounted, without further
evidence, as coming to the daughter, for purposes of descent under the
laws of Nebraska, by gift of an ancestor.
A father, otherwise the heir, cannot inherit from his daughter whom he
has murdered for the purpose of possessing himself of her estate.

Error to the District Court for Otoe County (Second Dis-

trict).
0. P. Mason, for plaintiff in error.
John C. Watson, Frank T. Ransom, Geo. D. Scofield, and

E. F. Warren, for defendants in error.
COBB, C. J., January 9, 1891. The defendants in error on
December 28, 1887, made their complaint in the District
Court of Otoe County, setting up:
That on April 28, 1881, Elijah Gibson, then the owner of the northeast
quarter of section 5, township 7 north, of range 14eastof the 6th P. m., in
Otoe County, deeded and conveyed the same, in fee simple, to Emma
Shellenberger, wife of Leander Shellenberger, and the mother of Maggie
Shellenberger and Joseph Lee Shellenberger,'then infants and minors.
That subseqqently, and at no long period, the precise date of which does
not appear, Emma Shellenberger died intestate, seized of said premises,
leaving as her sole heirs at law her husband and children, and that upon
her death the land descended to her husband during his lifetime, and that
he became the tenant by his right of courtesy, with the remainder after
his death to his said children. That on April 29, 1886, the said Maggie
died intestate, without issue, leaving as her only heir her father, who
thereupon, with the surviving son and brother, became tenants in common of said premises, subject to the life estate of the father. That subsequently on May 3, x886, Leander Shellenberger and Miranda, his wife, by
warranty deed conveyed to the defendants in error their interests in the
premises, being the life estate of Leander and one undivided half of the
remainder. That on July 23, 1887, Leander departed this life, and the defendants in error and Joseph Lee Shellenberger became the owners as
tenants in common, each owning one undivided half of said land.
The defendants in error further allege that Joseph Lee Shellenberger
was a minor over the age of fourteen years; that the enjoyment of the
premises in common was liable to difficulties and controversies, and was
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attended with great inconveniences to them; that their co-tenant could
not contract or legally consent to the making of improvements, and for
the same reason was incapable of consenting to an amicable partition of
the premises or of selling his interest therein to them, or of purchasing
their interest himself.

The plaintiff in error was made dcfend nt in the court
below, judgment -was asked confirming the shares in the
premises to the parties set forth, and for partition thereof, or,
if the same could not be equitably divided, that it be sold
and the proceeds divided according to the respective rights
of the parties.
On March 13, 1888, on application of the guardian of the
minor defendant, 0. P. Mason, Esq., was appointed guardian
ad liem for the defendant, with leave to answer, and
answered:
Denying each and every allegation not expressly admitted, but admitting that the premises were conveyed to Emma Shellenberger as alleged;
that she died intestate seized of the premises, leaving as her sole heirs her
children and her husband, as alleged, to whom the land descended, with
life estate in the husband, who became tenant by courtesy, with remainder
after his death to the children as alleged, and further setting up that on or
about the twenty-seventh day of April, x886, the said Leander Shellenberger willfully, feloniously, and of his deliberate, premeditated malice, did
kill and murder his daughter, Maggie Shellenherger, and she then and
there died intestate and without issue, leaving her father, Leander Shellenberger, who murdered her for the purpose of possessing himself of her
estate and title in fee simple to the land aforesaid; and said plaintiffs
claim that, by and through said murder and the death of said Maggie
Shellenberger, the said Leander Shellenberger became a tenant in common of said premises with the survivor, Joseph L. Shellenberger; that on
or about the first day of May, i886, the said Leander Shellenberger was
arrested and charged with the murder of the said Maggie Shellenberger;
that the said complainants herein, well knowing of the facts, and being
attorneys at law, undertook the defense of said Shellenberger, and to
secure them for their said services the said Leander Shellenberger did, on
or about the third day of May, 1886, with his wife, Miranda Shellenberger,
duly convey to the plaintiffs, by warranty deed duly executed, their interest in said premises, being the estate as claimed by the complainants
for life of Leander Shellenberger and one undivided one-half of the remainder; that shortly thereafter the said Leander Shellenberger was indicted and charged with the murder of said Margaret Shellenberger, and
such proceedings were had in said cause in the State of Nebraska against
Leander Shellenberger, indicted for the murder of his daughter, the said
Maggie Shellenberger ; but at the November term of the District Court
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sitting within and for Otoe County, in the year 1886, he was convicted
and sentenced for said murder, which sentence and judgment of the
Court remains unreversed in said Court; that afterwards, and on or about
the twenty-third day of July, 1887, the said Leander- Shellenberger was
taken from the jail of Otoe County, while under the sentence of death,
and by a mob hanged. And the defendant herein answering charges and
avers the fact to be, that the said plaintiffs in said petition at the time
they took a conveyance of said premises from said Leander Shellenberger
and wife, well knew the facts; that the said Leander Shellenberger came
to said lands by the murder of his child, Maggie Shellenberger, and well
knew all the proceedings in said Court, resulting in his conviction, the
judgment and sentence; and this defendant herein answering says, that
the said Leander Shellenberger could acquire no estate or interest, or
right or title in and to the lands in controversy, by and through his act of
the murder of Maggie Shellenberger: and this defendant in further
answering says, that the said Leander Shellenberger did willfully, maliciously, and of his premeditated and deliberate malice, kill and murder
the said Maggie Shelenberger, and cut her throat from ear to ear, for the
sole purpose of removing her from this life, that he might inherit the
lands which descended to her by and through the death of her mother;
that the defendant in further answering says; that it is contrary to the law
of the land that any should be permitted to come to an estate or an inheritance by their own willful act of murder. And the said defendant in
further answering say-s, that the said Leander Shellenberger could take no
estate from the said Maggie Shellenberger, whose death he had compassed
and produced, and that he took no estate to himself, and conveyed none
to the said plaintiffs herein, and the said plaintiffs acquired no right, title
or interest in and to the said estate, by and through the death of said
Maggie Shellenberger, caused by said Leander Shellenberger as hereinbefore alleged.

The guardian asked a decree that Leander Shellenberger
took no estate by the death of the daughter, but that her
estate descended to the brother, the minor defendant in this
suit.
To this answer the plaintiffs' demurrer was sustained,,and
:
the following decree was rendered
This cause came on this twenty-fourth day of March, 1888, to be heard
upon the petition, answer, and demurrer of the plaintiffs to the answer of
the defendant, made by 0. P. Mason; as guardian adliten for the defendant, Joseph L. Shellenberger, and the same is here argued and submitted
to the Court, and the Court, being well advised in the premises, doth sustain said demurrer, to which action of the Court the defendant excepts.
And the said defendant, by his guardian adliem,'electsto stand on his
answer, and the Court doth find in favor of the plaintiffs, and that the
plaintiffs are the owners in fee simple of the undivided one-half of the
following described lands and premises, to wit: The northeast quarter of
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section 5, in township 7 north, range 14 east of the 6th P. X., according
to government survey, the said premises lying and being situated in
Otoe County, Nebraska, and the defendant, Joseph L. Shellenberger,
is the owner in fee simple of the other undivided one-half of said
premises, and the plaintiffs are entitled to the partition of said premises.
It is therefore considered, adjudged, and decreed by the Court, that the
shares of each of said parties, and their interests respectively in said
lands, be and the same are hereby confirmed, and that the partition be
made accordingly. It is further ordered that Lewis Dunn, M. R. Campbell, C. W. Seymore be and they are hereby appointed to make the partition of said real estate and premises into the requisite number of shares,
and report the same to the present term of this Court. And this cause
coming on further to be heard on the report of the referees heretofore
appointed herein, on the motion of the plaintiffs to confirm the same, and
it appearing to the Court that the said referees took and subscribed to the
oath required by law, and the Court having carefully examined the saidreport, and it appearing therefrom that the partition of said real estate
cannot be made without great prejudice to the owner thereof, and the
Court being satisfied with the report, the same is hereby by the Court
confirmed and ordered to be entered of record, to all of which the defendant excepts. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the Court,
that the said referees proceed to sell said premises at public sale, upon
execution, for cash, it the east front door of the Court House, in Nebraska
City, in Otoe County, Nebraska, and the said referees, before proceeding
to sell said real estate, to give security in the sum of $500, to be approved
by the Court or the judge thereof, conditioned for the faithful discharge
of their duties, and the said referees be-required to make report of their
doings into Court, to all of which defendant, by his guardian ad litem,
excepts, and prays an appear to the Supreme Court, which is allowed, and
the amount of the supersedeas bond to stay proceedings thereon is fixed
at the sum of $300, and forty days is hereby allowed to reduce his exceptions to writing.

The petition in error sets up:
i. The Court erred in sustaining the plaintiffs' demurrer.
2. In finding that the plaintiff were the owners in fee of the undivided
one-half of the premises, and were entitled to a partition of the same.
3. In confirming a share to tlje plaintiffs.
4. In appointing referees to make partition.
5. In confirming the report of referees.
6. In ordering a sale of the premises.

Two questions are presented and argued in the briefs of
the plaintiff in error.
First-Whether upon the death of Maggie (Margaret)
Shellenberger, eliminating all considerations of the cause or
manner of her death, the grantor of plaintiffs in the court
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below could take her estate in the lands in controversy by
inheritance?
Counsel for thd plaintiff in error contends that he could
not, for the reason that the land, as counsel claims that the
petition shows, came from Gibson, the father of Emma
Shellenberger, deceased, who gave or devised the land to his
daughter, and which upon her death descended to her two
children, and that the estate being ancestral, Leander Shellenberger did not take it, that it did not descend to him on
the death of her child, but descended to the surviving child.
But it is to be observed that it cannot be gathered from the
words of the petition that the land in controversy was either
given or devised by Gibson to his daughter, or that it was
an ancestral estate, but it does appear upon the date named
that Elijah Gibson, then and before that time the owner of
the land, by deed duly conveyed the same to his daughter,
Emma Shellenberger, in fee simple. The title then, as I
view it from the pleadings, commences with Emma Shellenberger, who must be presumed to have derived the same by
purchase from Elijah Gibson, whom it inferentially appedrs
was her father. I am therefore of the opinion that section
33 of chapter 23, Comp. Stat, is not applicable to this case,
for-the reason that the estate in controversy did not come to
the intestate by descent, devise, or gift of some one of his
ancestors, and it is therefore not material to inquire whether
said section of statute is applicable to any case not involving
the claim of kindred of the half blood. But that the case
comes within the provision of section 30 of said chapter,
which provides that:
'When any person shall die seized of lands, tenements or hereditaments
* they shall descend, subject to his debts, in the manner following:
* Second-If he shall have no issue, his estate shall descend to his
widow during her natural lifetime, and after her decease to his father;
and if he shall have no issue nor widow, his estate shall descend to his
*
*

father.

Upon the Ace of the law, and of the relation of Leander
Shellenberger to the decedent, and without regard to or consideration of the second ground of defense set up in the
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answer, Leauder Shellenberger would, upon the death of
Margaret (Maggie) Shellenberger, take her estate in the
lands by inheritance.
The second question is presented by the d'efendant in the
court below in the following words:
That on or about the twenty-seventh day of April, i886i the said Teander Shellenberger willfully, feloniously, of his deliberate, premeditated
malice, did kill and murder his daughter, Maggie Shellenberger, and she
then and there died intestate and without issue, leaving her father, Leander Shellenberger, who murdered her for the purpose of possessing himself of her estate and title in fee simple to said land.

The question presented by this clause of the answer is
thus tersely stated by counsel for the plaintiff in error in
his brief:
Can a man realize substantial benefit fiom his own willful act of deliberate and premeditated murder? Can he legally hold and enjoy the fi-dts
of his crime?

This question was decided by the Court of. Appeals of the
State of New York in the case of Riggs v. Palmer (1889),
115 N. Y. 5o6. The facts of that case, briefly stated, are
these: Francis B. Palmer made his last will and testament
in which he gave small legacies to his two daughters, Mrs.
Riggs and Mrs Preston, the plaintiffs in said action, and the
remainder of his estate to his grandson, the defendant,
Elmer M. Palmer, subject to the support of his mother,
Susan Palmer, with a gift over to the two daughters, subject
to the support of the mother in case Elmer should survive
him and die under age, unmarried, and without issue. The
testator at the date of his will owned a farm and considerable personal property. He was a widower and thereafter
in March, 1882, he was married to Mrs. Bruse, with whom
he entered into an antenuptial contract, in which it was
agreed that in lieu of dower and all other claim upon his
estate, in case she survived him, she should have support
upon his farm during her life, and such support was expressly
charged upon the farm. At the date of the will and subsequent to the death of the testator, Elmer lived wvith him as
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a member of his family, and at his death was sixteen years
of age. He knew of the provisions made in his favor in
the will, and that he might prevent his grandfather from revoking such provisions, which he had manifested some intention to do, and to obtain the speedy enjoyment and inmediate possession of his property, he willfully murdered
him by'poison.
It appears that the will was duly proved and admitted to
probate and an administrator with the will annexed appointed. Thereupon the action was brought to enjoin the
administrators from disposing of the personal property of
the decedent (testator) to the defendant (Elmer Palmer), and
to declare him not entitled to the real estate under the will,
upon the ground that'he, being by and under the will practically constituted universal devisee and legatee of Francis
B. Palmer, murdered the testator, who was his grandfather,
to get immediate enjoyment of the property himself, and to
prevent a revocation of the will. The General Term of the
Supreme Court having rendered a judgment for the defendant, the case was taken to the Court of Appeals. The majority of the Court, in an exhaustive opinion by Judge
EARLE, reversed the opinion of the Supreme Court, and directed a judgment to be entered enjoining Elmer Palmer
and the administrator from using any of the personal or real
estate left by the testator for Elmer's benefit ; that the devise
and bequest in the will to Elmer be declared ineffective to
pass the title to him; that by reason of the crime of murder
committed upon the grandfather, he is deprived of any interest in the estate left by him.
In entering upon the argument which led to the above
conclusion the writer of the opinion says:
The defendants say that the testator is dead; that his will was made in
due form and has been admitted to probate, and that therefore it must
have effect according to the letter of the law. It is quite true that
statutes regulating the making proof and effect of wills, and the devolution of property, if literally construed, and if their force and effect can in
no way and under no circumstances be controlled or modified, give this
property to the murderer. The- purpose of those statutes was to enable
testators to dispose of their estates to the objects of their bounty at
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death, and to carry into effect their final wishes, legally expressed, and in
considering and giving effect to them this purpose must be kept in view.
It was the intention of the lawmakers that the donees in a will should
have the property given to them. But it never could have been their intention that a donee who murdered the testator to make the will operative
should have any benefit under it. If such a case had been present to
their minds, and it had been supposed necessary to make some provision
of law to meet it, it cannot be doubted that they would have provided forit.
It is a familiar canon of construction that a thing which is within the
intention ofthe makers of the statute is as much within the statute as if it
were within the letter, and a thing which is within the letterof the statute
is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers.

To these propositions the opinion cites many authorities
of great weight and general acceptance.
This opinion cites and discusses the case of the New York
11futual Life Insurance Compbany v. Armstrong (1886), I7

U. S. 591, which case is also cited by counsel for the plaintiff in error.
The facts of that case may be shortly stated as follows:
One Hunter, partly in person and partly through one John
M. Armstrong, effected an insurance and received a policy
of insurance in the New York Mutual Life Insurance Company upon the life of the said John M. Armstrong, in whose
life he claimed to have an interest growing out of certain
partnership relations. Within six weeks after the policy was
issued Armstrong was attacked at night in a street in Camden, New Jersey, and received blows on his head which
fractured his skull, from which he died two days afterwards.
Suspicion fell upon Hunter as the perpetrator or instigator
of the attack. He was accordingly arrested; was indicted
and tried for the murder of Armstrong; he was convicted,
sentenced to death and hanged. The suit was brought
against the life insurance company, removed to the Circuit
Court of the United Stafes, and brought' upon error to the
Supreme Court, where the judgment against the insurance
company was reversed. In the opinion, the Court said:
But independently of any proof of the motives of Hunter in obtaining
the policy, and even assuming that they were just and proper, he forfeited
all rights under it, when, to secure its immediate payment, he murdered
the assured. Ic would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country
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if one could recover insurance money payable on the death of a party

whose life he had feloniously taken. As well might he recover insurance
money upon a building which he had willfully fired.

The principle of these cases, especially that of Riggs v.
Palmer,is applicable to the case at bar, their analogies are
immediate and certain. As I have already stated, in effect,
the relation of Leander Shellenberger to Margaret Shellenberger was such that the law upon her death, ft'ma facie,
gave him her estate. But he was a man of full age while
she was an infant of tender years. In the ordinary course of
nature she would outlive him; she also would grow up to
womanhood, marry, and have issue who would become entitled to her estate upon her death, to the exclusion of her
father. .
To prevent this, and get the title and possession of her estate at once, according to the allegations of the answer demurred to, he murdered her. Had her death been the result
of natural causes, or a cause of which he was innocent, he
would have taken her estate by inheritance; had he been allowed to take it at her death, caused as it was, he would have
taken it by purchase, rather than by inheritance, and at a
price of such enormous iniquity that the mind shudders at
its mention-the murder of his own motherless daughter. I
quite agree with the Court of Appeals that, had it been in the
mind of the framers of our statute of descent that a case like
this would arise under it, they would have so framed the law.
that its letter would have left no hope for the obtaining of
an inheritance by such means.
The holding that a person cannot take by inheritance the
estate of a person whom he murders, for the purpose of removing the life that stands between him and the estate, is
sustained by many maxims of the law and considerations of
sound policy, and is not in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, or of this State, against
bills of attainder, and that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law. Were it enacted into
a statute it would take no one's property from him, norwork
Vor,. XXX-,i8
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corruption of any one's blood, but would only stand in the
way of taking an estate as a reward for the commission of
crime.
The case of Owens v. Owens (1888), IOO N. C. 240, was
where a widow was convicted upon a charge of being accessory before the fact to the murder of her husband. She afterwards brought suit to have her dower assigned in the real
property left by him. The Supreme Court, reversing the
judgment below, held that, notwithstanding her criminal
participation in her husband's death, she was entitled to be
endowed of a share of his estate. The reason given by the
Court in the opinion is that the statute having provided but
one cause for which a widow should be barred of her dower,
which was when she should commit adultery, and not be
living with her husband at his death, that her right to dower
is not affected by the fact that the intestate died at her hands
or through her procurement. I agree with the New York
Court of Appeals, which also reviewed this case in the
opinion in Riggs v. Palmer,sufira, in an unwillingness to
assent to the doctrine of this case.
Counsel for the defendants in error in their brief say, "as
the appellees (defendants in error) are bonafidepurchasers of
the property in controversy, they cannot be affected by any
wrongful acts, if any, of their grantor." As I view the case,
Leander Shellenberger not taking the estate of Margaret in
the land on account of his having murdered her in order to
obtain it, he was only possessed of a life estate in the land,
which estate he conveyed to the defendants in error, and
which estate terminated upon his death, by violence as stated
in answer. No question of bona fides therefore arises. On
the other hand, whether the defendants in error, at the time
they took the conveyance of the land in question from Leander Shellenberger, knew of his crime and its motive, is .not
deemed material and will not be considered.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and judgment will be entered in this court that the said Leander
Shellenberger took no estate from the said Margaret (Maggie) Shellenberger, but that the said estate, upon her death
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in the manner and by the means stated, descended and
passed to the said Joseph Lee Shellenberger and remain
Judgment accordingly. The other Judges concur.
The principal case is one ,of
special interest, not alone from the
tragic and revolting circumstances
out of which the cause of action
arose, but also from the fact that it
forms a link in a chain of decisions,
all of comparatively recent date, involving a new and important application of one of the most ancient
maxims of the law, viz., that no
man shall profit by his own wrong.
This maxim has variously found
expression as follows:
Ex dolo nalo non orituractio.
Ex turi causa non orituractio.
Nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur actionem.
Nullum comnodum caperefiolest
de injuria suapiropria.
Frustralegis auxilium gueri,
qui in legem committil.
The mooted question in the line
of authorities above mentioned is
the applicability of this principle
to a state of facts where the title to
property (either real or personal)
would lawfully vest in one party at
another's death, but that event
has been caused or contributed to
by the beneficiary.
The doctrine of the principal case
may be discussed under two heads:
(i) the growth of the principle as
thus applied; (2) does it impose
an added penalty for the crime?
.. Growth of theDoctrine. (A.)
By the Civil Law.
The codes of the Civil Law, in
various countries where that system has prevailed, provide for such
emergencies.
The heir or legatee is regarded
as unworthy, if he kill or strive to
take the life of the estate leaver:

Mackeldy's Roman Law (Dropsie's
Ed.) 55o, taken from Justinian's
Digest, Liber XXXIV, Title IX.
If he who is to succeed as heir
either by testament or to an intestate, attempts anything against the
life of the person to whom he
should succeed, he shall be deprived
of the succession, although the attempt had not its effect, provided it
be sufficiently proved: Domat's
Civil Law (Cushing's Ed.), sec.
2551.

Unworthy to succeed, and as
such excluded from succession, are,
First, He who shall be condemned
for having caused or attempted to
cause the death of the defunct:
Code Napoleon, paragraph 737The following persons are unworthy of inheriting, and as such
are excluded from successions:
i. He who has been convicted of
killing or attempting to kill the
deceased: Lower Canada Civil
Code (Sharp's Ed. 1889), sec. 6o.
(B.) Under the Common Law.
Until within the last decade, no
English or American case appears
to have arisen where the principle
vas applied. The case of New
York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong (1886), ii7 U. S. 591, may
be taken as the starting point,
being referred to in most of the
other cases of this class. The gist
of the decision there, as well as the
facts, are quite fully set out in the
opinion in the principal case, and
need not be repeated here. But it
is to be noted that the maxim
under discussion was not expressly
applied, the Court basing its decision rather on the peculiar prin-

SHZLI NBmRGER V. RANSOM ET AL.
ciples of insurance law.
In Owe= v. Owens (x888), zoo
N. C. 24o, the plaintiff sought an,

assignment to her of dower in the
estate of her late husband, to the
murder of whom she had been
convicted of being an accessory.
The Court states the question as
follows: "Is the rightof the wife
to share in the personal estate as a
distributee, lost or affected by the
fact that the intestate died at her
hands or through her procurement?
Does the child who slays a parent,
thereby lose his right to participate
with his brothers and sisters in the
distribution of the personal, or to
take his part of the descended real
estate? Or, reversing the matter,
does the husband who kills his
wife, impair his right, under the
statute of distributions, to succeed
to the ownership of her personal
property left after the payment of
debts? Or, in general terms, does
anyone as a consequence of an unlawfill takingof human life, become
thereby disabled to take a part of
the estate left by the deceased
'which the law gives him, and gives
him subject to no such condition?' "
And by way of answer the opinion
proceeds: "The natural feeling
inspired by her proved co-operation
in the unnatural and wicked act of
taking her husband's life and thus
availing herself of the generous
provision of the law, that secures
her surviving, a home for life, is
repugeant to a claim preferred
under such circumstances of perfidy to the marital relations. In
the absence of authority, the wellinstructed and able Judge who
tried the cause, ruled against the
allowance of dower, as it would in
fact be to reward crime by conferring benefits that result from,
and are procured by its commis-

sion. We feel ourselves unable to
concur in this conclusion, for the
reason that while the law gives the
dower, and makes it paramount to
the claims of creditors even, there
is no provision for its forfeiture for
crime, however heinous it may be,
and even when the husband is its
victim." The statutory provision
of North Carolina relative to the
forfeiture of dower, is as follows:
"Widows shall be endowed as at
common law as in this chapter de-

fined: Provided, if any matried
woman shall commit adultery, and
shall not be living with her husband at his death, she shall thereby
lose all right to dower in the lands
and tenements of her husband;
and any such adultery may be
pleaded in bar of any action or
proceeding for the recovery of
dower": Code of 1883, sec. 2103.
" As," says the Court, "there is no
other act of the wife which by
statute known to us, works a forfeiture, we do not see how any
legal obstacle can be in the way of
her seeking to get what the law, in
unqualified terms, gives her."
Riggs v. Palmer (1889); II5 N.
Y. 5o6, was rendered by a divided
Court,Judges GRAY and DANonT

dissenting

The facts and the doc-

trine of the majority opinionare reviewed at length in the principal
case. In the dissenting opinion,
GRAY, J., says: "I cannot find any
support for the argument that the
respondent's succession to the
property should be avoided because
of his criminal act, when the laws
are silent. Public policy does not
demand it, for the demands of public policy are satisfiedby the proper
execution of the laws and the punishment of the crime. There has
been no convention between the
testator and his legatee, nor is there
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any such contractual element in
such a disposition of property by a
testator, as to impose or imply conditions in the legatee. The appellants' argumentpractically amounts
to this: That as the legatee has
been guilty of a crime, by the commission of which he is placed in a
position to soonerreceive the benefits of the testamentary provisions,
his rights to the property should be
forfeited and he should be divested
of his estate. To allow their argument to prevail, would allow the
diversion by the Court of the testator's estate into the hands of persons, whom possibly enough, for
all we know, the testator might not
have chosen or desired as its recipient. Practically the Court is
asked to make another will for the
testator. The laws do not warrant
this judicial action, and mere presumption would not be strong
enough to sustain it." In the majority opinion, EAFIL, J., says of
Owens v. Owens, suf-ra: "I am
unwilling to assent to the doctrine
of that case. The statutes provide
dower for a wife who has the misfortune to survive her husband and
thus lose his support and protection. It is clearly beyond their
purpose to make provision for a
wife who by her own crime makes
herself a widow and willfully and
intentionally deprives herself of the
support and protection of her husband. As she might have died before him, and thus never have been
his widow, she cannot by her crime
vest herself with an estate. The
principle which lies at the bottom
of the maxim Voleti non fit inJuria, should be applied to such a
case, and a widow should not, for
the purpose of acquiring, as such,
property rights, be permitted to allege a widowhood which she has

BY MURDER.
wickedly and intentionally created." And of the leading maxim
which he would here apply, the
same learned Judge says: "No one
shall be permitted to profit by his
own fraud, or to take advantage of
his own wrong, or to found any
claim upon his own iniquity, or to
acquire property by his own crime.
These maxims are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in
universal law administered in all
civilized countries, and have nowhere been superseded by statutes."
In the case of Maggie Schreiner
v. High Court ofIllinois Order of
Foresters,Illinois Appellate Court
(i8go)-[not yet reported in the
official series, but furnished to the
writer through the courtesy of Albion Cate, Esq., of the Chicago
Bar, counsel for plaintiff in error in
the case], the plaintiff in error,
who had been convicted of murdering her husband, sought to recover
as the beneficiary of an insurance
policy on his life. The Superior
Court of Cook County, from which
the case was brought on error, held
that under the facts she was entitled to nothing on the policy.
The judgment was reverped on
other grounds, but the Court, per
MORAN, J., strongly reiterates the
general doctrine: "Public policy
is a law with reference to which
all contracts must be made and interpreted, and public policy forbids
that contracts shall receive such an
interpretation as will encourage
crime or make their performance a
reward thereof. Wager policies
were held void at common law bcause of the obvious temptation
presented by such policies to the
commission of crime. Quite as
clear, and it would seem a more
imperative policy, required the
rule to be that the beneficiary in a
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life policy cannot recover when the
sufficient punishment. In the trial
event by which he is to benefit, to
and punishment of the respoadent,
wit: the death of the insured, has
the law has vindicated itself for the
been intentionally accomplished
outrage which he committed, and
by his own act. -To hold otherwise
further judicial utterance upon the
world be to furnish to the party insubject of punishment or deprivaterested the strongest tempation to
tion of rights is barred. We may
bring about if possible the event
not, in the language of the Court
insured, against. It is wholly unin People v. Thornton (188i), 25
necessary to find in the policy or
Hun. 456, ' enhance the penalties
the certificate, an exception in
and forfeitures provided by law for
terms, against the intentional killthe punishment of crime."' On
ing of the insured by the benethe other hand, EARL-, J., in the
ficiary. Such an exception is in- majority opinion, says: "My view
troduced into the contract by the
of this case does not inflict upon
law, which by civil power and
Elmer any greater or other punishcoercion seeks to enforce the divine
ment for his crime than the law
command, 'Thou shalt not kill.'
specifies. It takes from him no
No court will lend its aid to one
property, but simply holds that he
who founds his cause of action on
shall not acquire property by his
his intentional wrong. If this con- crime, and thus be rewarded for its
tract read in terms that the High
commission."
Court would pay the money to
So the Illinois Appellate Court
plaintiff on the death of Schreiner
in Schreinerv. Order ofForesters:
whether he should die from natural
"Then, as a fair interpretation of
causes, or by the hands of plaintiff, the contract, the death is occaall would agree that it would be sioned 'by a cause which exempts
void as against public policy. Is
the insurer from liability. This
it not plain that the same policy
avoids the view that the beneficiary
which would render it void if ex- is denied the right to recover as an
pressed in terms, forbids an inter- additional punishment to that prepretation of its obligations which
scribed by law for the offense.
would give to the contract the same There is no attempt to enhance
injurious and immoral operation ?"
the pains and penalties provided
2. Does the doctrine of the prinby law for the punishment of
cipalcaseimpose, in effect, an added crime, nor is it said to the plaintiff,
p=naltyforcrime?
-'you. are a criminal, and can have
Judge Gnzy, in the dissenting
no aid from the Court to enforce
opinion in Riggsv. Palmer(1889),
legal rights arising to you under a
ix5 N. Y. 519, says: "To concede
contract.'
Simply, no right has
appellant's views would involve accrued to her under the contract
the imposition of an additional
if she intentionally, and without
punishment or penalty upon the legal excuse or justification, killed
respondent. What power or war- the assured. "
rant have the courts to add to the
A review of the above adjudicarespondent's penalties by depriv- tions will show that the law aw lling him of property? The law has cable to this dasm of cases can
punished him for his crime, and hardly be regarded as settled for
we may not say that it was an in- the whole country, however much

INHERITANCE BY MURDER.
it maybe in the particular States
and fora where the questions have
arisen. Of the five decisions thus
flr announced, the first, N. Y.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong,
was based upon and limited by the
peculiarities of a special branch of
the Law; the second, Owens v.
Owens, squarely repudiates the
doctrine of the principal case. In
Riggs v. Palmer, the Court was
divided, able and exhaustive opinions being written on both sides.
The two remaining decisions support the doctrine of the principal
case; and while the balance of
authority is in favor of that doctrine, and while, perhaps, also, the
trend of decisions is in its direction, yet it may safely be said that
further adjudication will be required to make it the settled law of
the American commonwealths.
The writer is in receipt of a con-

munication from J. W. King, Esq.,
of Eaton, 0., regarding the case of
Deem v. Risinger,pending before
the Court of Common Pleas of
Preble County, that State. Plaintiff's nephew, who was the only son
of his widowed mother, was convicted of killing the latter, she being
the sister of plaintiff, who seeks a
partition of decedent's property on
the theory that the son, through
his crime, was barred of the inheritance which would otherwise have
been his, under the provisions of
sec. 4158 of the Rev. Stats. of Ohio
(a general provision for descent of
real estate in case of intestacy].
The case is, at the present writing,
undecided, but its ultimate disposition promises to add another to the
growing list of authorities on this
new and important branch of the
CHARLmS S. LoniNGIR.
law.
Lincoln, Neb.

[THZ mAxim, ex dolo malo non oritur actio, was cited by Lord M SFmr x, in Holman v. Johnson (1775), Cowp. 343, to show that its object
was not the advantage of an individual but of the public: hence, in that
case, a sale and delivery on the continent, of tea intended to be smuggled
into England, was still allowed to be the foundation of an action for the
price. The recent American case ofJones et at. v. Surprise (1886), 64 N.
H. 243; s. c. (reported in full) 27 AZMICAN LAW REGIST-ER 303, with a
brief note, deals with a similar question arising out of a sale of intoxicating liquors in Boston, Massachusetts ; this sale was to be followed by a
delivery in Boston so as to evade the New Hampshire laws. The New
Hampshire Court refused to permit a recovery on the ground that "No
people are bound to enforce, or hold valid, in their courts of justice, any
contract which is injurious to their public rights, or offends their morals,
or contravenes their policy, or violates public law." This principle has
been distinguished by a recent writer, in faulting the judgment in the case
under annotation, by supposing that a purchaser for value had intervened. The supposition seems unfounded in fact, and would practically
pervert the law of inheritance into an inducement to murder. Upon this
broad ground, it may also be said that there is no contractual relation involved, and, in this way, the judgment has been faulted: but such a narrow and technical view overlooks the object of laws relating to descents.
The heir is an artificial creation of positive law, with no constitutional or
natural right whatever. This is the foundation of the whole law of testaments, for NAemo est haresvizentis: Co. Litt. 22, b.-ED.
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Supreme Court of the United State.
GROVER & BAKER S. M. CO. v. RADCLIFFE.
A judgment confessed in a Pennsylvania court by the prothonotary and
without appearance by the defendant or his attorney, under the provisions of a local statute and written authority for a confession by any
attorney in the State of New York or any other State, is not obligatory in
the State of Maryland, because such confession does not conform to the
authority conferred by the writing.
An authority to any attorney of any court of record in the State of New
York, or any other State, is not a consent to be bound by the local laws of
any State of the Union which may authorize a cgnfession of judgment
under such a power, without appearance by an attorney.
The full faith and credit to be accorded to the judgment of a Pennsylvania court, in another State, does not give a personal judgment any
validity unless the defendant has been served personally or appeared to
the action in Pennsylvania.

Error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland.
Albert Constable, for the plaintiff in error.
J. A. J. Creswell, for the defendant in error.
FULLER, C. J., December 8, 189o. This was an action
brought in the Circuit Court of Cecil County, Maryland, by
the Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company against
James Benge and John Benge, who were then citizens of
Delaware, by summons and attachment on warrant which
was served on William P. Radcliffe as garnishee. Radcliffe
filed pleas on behalf of the Benges according to the Maryland practice, putting the validity of the judgment in issue.
The declaration -was in these words:
This suit is instituted to recover the sum of twenty-three hundred dollars from the defendants, due and owing from the defendants to the plaintiff on and by virtue of a certain judgment which the plaintiff, on the
third day of January, in the year eighteen hundred and seventy-four, in
the Court of Common Pleas in and for the County of Chester, in- the
State of Pennsylvania, one of the United States of America, by the judgment of the said Court, recovered against the defendants, for the sum of

three thousand dollars; which said judgment is still in force and unsatisfled.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Upon the trial, a record from the Court of Common Pleas
in and for the County of Chester, in the State of Pennsylvania, was read in evidence, as follows:
I do hereby enter judgment against the defendants and in favor of the
plaintiff in this cause for the sum of three thousand dollars, lawful
money, debt, besides costs, etc., on a bond and warrant of attorney to
confess judgment, dated March sixteenth, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and seventy-two, conditioned that if the above-named James Benge,
his heirs, executors, or administrators, shall well and truly pay, or cause
to be paid, to the said Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company, the
full amount of each and every liability incurred or to be incurred by him,
the said James Benge, to or with the said Grover & Baker Sewing
Machine Company, for and on account of all sewing machines, and al
sewing machine findings, silks and threads, or other articles, including
promissory notes and other property that may from time to time hereafter be sold, consigned, supplied or otherwise intrusted to him, the said
James Benge, by the said Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company,
upon his orders or by his acceptance, with or without notice to the said
John Benge, at the tiniie or times when each and every liability shall
become due and payable or at such time and times for which payment of
the same may hereafter, with or without notice to the said John Benge,
be extended, then this obligation to be void. This obligation is intended
to operate as a continuing security for the payment, when the same shall
become due and be demanded, of all and every liability incurred to and
with the said Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company by the said
James Benge aforesaid, to the amount not exceeding the limit of this
bond. January 3, 2874. Judgment, $3,ooo. JpoH A. RuPERT, Proth.

The bond referred to was executed March i6, 3872, by
James Benge, then a citizen of Pennsylvania, and John
Benge, then a citizen of Maryland, and was as follows:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THZSE PRESENTS, that James Benge, of West
Chester, Pennsylvania, John Benge, of Kimbleville, Cecil County, Maryland, are hereby held and firmly bound unto the Grover & Baker Sewing
Machine Company, a corporation duly established by law in the City of
Boston, State of Massachusetts, also doing business at Philadelphia, State
of Pennsylvania, in the sum of three thousand dollars, lawful money of
the United States of America, to be paid to the said Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company, its legal representatives or assigns; for which
payment, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, heirs, executors,
and administrators, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents. Sealed
with our seals. Dated the x6th day of March, one thousand eight
hundred and seventy-two.
AND we hereby authorize any attorney of any court of record in the
State of New York, or any other State, to confess judgment against us
for the said sum, with release of errors, etc.
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WHERRAS, the above-named James Benge, at the special instance and
request of the above-bound John Benge, has obtained a credit with the
said Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company for machines of their
manufacture, and for sewing machine findings, silks and threads mannfactured and dealt in by said Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company,
and for other articles, including promissory notes and other property to
be hereafter supplied to him, the said James Benge:
Now THs CONDITION of this obligation is such that if the above-bound
James Benge, his heirs, executors, or administrators, shall well and truly
pay or cause to be paid to the said Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company the full amount of each and every liability incurred by him, the said
James Benge, to or with the said Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Compadiy, for and on account of all sewing machines, and all sewing machine
findings, silks and threads, or other articles, incliding promissory notes
and other property that may from time to time hereafter be sold, consigned, supplied, or otherwise intrusted to him, the said James Benge, by
the said Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company upon his orders or by
his acceptance, -ith or without- notice to the said John Benge, at the
time or times when each and every liability shall become due and payable, or at such time and times for which payment of the same may hereafter, with or without notice to the said John Benge, be extended, then
this obligation to be void. This obligation is intended to operate as a
continuing security for the p'ayefit' when the same shall become due
and be demanded, of all and every liability incurred to and with the said
Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company by the said James Benge, as
aforesaid, to the amount mnot exceeding the limit of this bond, three thousand dollars.
J"B"E"
JA=s' BNGz. [Seal.
JOHN BENGE.
[Seal.]

Plaintiff read in evidence a statute of the State of Penn24, i8o6 [4 SnL L. 278], as follows:

sylvania, enacted February

[SEc. XXVIII. That] it shall be the duty of the prothonotary of any
court of record, within this commonwealth, on the application of any
person being the original holder (or assignee of such holder) of a note,
bond, or other instrument of writing, in which judgment is confessed, or
containing a warrant for an attorney at law, or other person, to confess
judgment, to enter judgment against the person or persons who executed
the same, for the amount which, from the face of the instrument, may appear to be due, without the agency of an attorney, or declaration filed,
with such stay of execution as may be therein mentioned, for the fee of
cne dollar, to be paid by the defendant, particularly entering on his
docket the date and tenor of the instrument of writing on which the judgment may be founded, which shall have the same force and effect as if a
declaration had been filed, and judgment confessed by an attorney, or
judgment obtained in open court and in term time; and the defendant
shall not be compelled to pay any costs or fee to the plaintiff's attorney,
when judgment is entered on any instrument of writing as aforesaid.

OPINION OV THE COURT.

It was stipulated that "the common law of Pennsylvania,
the practice of her courts, and the construction placed by
her courts upon any statutes in force in that State, may be
proved by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts, as reported
in the printed volumes of Pennsylvania Reports." The
other evidence adduced tended to establish or disprove that
the property in controversy in the attachment and garnishment belonged to John Benge. The Court instructed the
jury "that the statute law of the State of Pennsylvania,
offered in evidence by the plaintiff, and admitted by the defendant to be the law under which the judgment offered in
evidence by the plaintiff-was entered, did not authorize the
Prothonotary of the Court of Common Pleas in and for the
County of Chester, in the State of Pennsylvania, to enter the
said judgment, and their verdict should be for the defendant." The verdict was accordingly returned for the defendant, and judgment entered thereon, and an appeal prosecuted
.therefrom to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland,
by which the judgment was affirmed, and a writ of error was
thereupon allowed to this Court. The opinion of the Court
of Appeals will be iound reported in 66 Md. 511 [1887].
The Maryland Circuit Court arrived at its conclusion upon
the ground that the statute of Pennsylvania relied on did not
authorize the Prothonotary of the Court of Common Pleas
of that State to enter the judgment ; and the Court of Appeals of Maryland reached the same result upon the ground
that the judgment was void as against John Benge, because
the Court rendering it had acquired no jurisdiction over his
person.
It is settled that notwithstanding the provision of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that "full faith
and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other State" (Article IV, §I),
and the Act of Congress passed in pursuance
thereof(l St. 1z2 ; Rev. St. §905), and notwithstanding the
averments in the record of the judgment itself, the jurisdiction of the court by which a judgment is rendered in any
State may be questioned in a collateral proceeding; that
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the jurisdiction of a foreign coir over the person or the
subject matter, embraced in the judgment or decree of such
court, is always open to inquiry; that, in this respect, a
court of another State is to be regarded as a foreign court;
and that a personal judgment is without validity if rendered
by a State court in an action upon a money demand against
a non-resident of the State, upon whom no personal service
of process within the State was made, and who did not appear: D'Arcy v. Ketchum (185o), ti How. (52 U. S.) 16s;
Thompison v. Whitman (1874), i8 Wall. (85 U. S.) 457; Hall
v. Lanning (1875), 91 U. S. 16o; .Pennoyer v. Neff (1878),
95 Id. 714. The rule is not otherwise in the State of Pennsylvania, where the judgment in question was rendered:
Guthri2e v. Lowry (1877), 84 Pa. 533; Scott v. Noble (1872),
72 Id. 115; Noble v. Oil Co. (1875), 69 Id. 354; Steel v.
Smith (1844), 7 Watts & S. 447; nor in the State of Maryland, where the action under review was brought upon it:
Bank of United States v. Merchants' Bank (1848), 7 Gill
415; Clark v. Bryan (I86o), 16 Md. 171; Veaver v. Boggs
(1873), 38 Md. 255.
And the distinction between the validity of a judgment
rendered in one State, under its local laws upon the subject,
and its validity in another State, is recognized by the highest tribunals of each of these States. Thus in Steel v.
Smith, 7 Watts & S. 477, it was decided, in 1844, that a
judgment of a court of another State does not bind the person of the defendant, in another jurisdiction, though it might
do so under the laws of the State in which the action was
brought, and that the Act of Congress does not preclude inquiry into the jurisdiction, or the right of the State to confer it. The action was brought on a judgment rendered in
Louisiana, and Mr. Chief Justice GIBsoN, in delivering the
opinion of the Court, said:
The record shows that there was service on one of the joint owners
which, in the estimation of the law of the Court, is service on all; for itis
affirmed in Hill v. Bowman (184o), already quoted N14 La. 445], that the
State of Louisiana holds all persons amenable to the process of her courts,
whether citizens or aliens, and whether present or absent. It was =I.1ed

OPINION OF THE COURT.
in George v. Fitzgerald(1838), I2 La. 604, that a defendant, though he
reside in another State, having neither domicile, interest, nor agent in
Louisiana, and having never been within its territorial limits, may yet be
sued in its courts by the instrumentality of a curator appointed by the
court to represent and defend him. All this is clear enough, as well us
that there was in this instance a general appearance by attorney, and a
judgment against all the defendants, which would have full faith and
credit given to it in the courts of the State. But thata judgmentisalways
regular when there has been an appearance by attorney, with or without
warrant, and that it cannot be impeached collaterally for anything but
fraud or collusion, is a municipal principle, and not an international one
having place in a question of State jurisdiction or sovereignty. Now,
though the courts of Louisiana would enforce this judgment against the
persons of the defendants, if found within reach of their process, yet,
where there is an attempt to enforce it by the process of another State, it
behooves the Court whose assistance is invoked to look narrowly into the
Constitutional injunction, and give the statute to carry it out a reasonable
interpretation.

Referring to Section 1307 of Mr. Justice STORY'S CoM-'
mentaries on the Constitution, and the cases cited, to which
he adds Benton v. Burgot (1823), io Serg. & R. 240, the
learned Judge inquires: "What, then, is the right of a State
to exercise authority over the persons of those who belong
to another jurisdiction, and who have perhaps not been out
of the boundaries of it?" and quotes from Vattel, Burge,
and from Mr Justice STORY (Confi. Laws, ch. 14, §539), that
"'no sovereignty can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits, to subject other persons or property to its judicial decisions. Every exertion of authority beyond these
limits is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in other tribunals;' and thus continues:
Such is the familiar, reasonable, and just principle of the law of nations;
and it is scarce supposable that the framers of the Constitution designed
to abrogate it between States which were to remain as independent ofeach
other, for all but National purposes, as they were before the Revolution.
Certainly it was not intended to legitimate an assumption of extraterritorial jurisdiction which would confound all distinctive principles of separate sovereignty ; and there evidently was such an assumption in the proceedings under consideration. * * But I would perhaps
do the jurisprudence of.Louisiana injustice, did I treat its cognizance of
the defendants as an act of usurpation. It makes no claim to extraterritorial authority, but merely concludes the party in its own courts, and
leaves the rest to the Constitution as carried out by the Act of Congress.
When, however, a creditor asks us to give such a judgment what is in
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truth an extraterritorial effect, he asks us to do what we will not, till we
are compelled by a mandate of the Court in the last resort.

In Weaver v. Boggs (1873), 38 Myd. 255, it was held that

suit could not be maintained in the courts of Maryland
upon a judgment of a court of Pennsylvania rendered upon
returns of nihil to two successive writs of scirefacias issued
to revive a Pennsylvania judgment of more than twenty
years' standing, where the defendant had for more than
twenty years next before the issuing of.the writs resided in
Maryland, and out of the jurisdiction of the Court that rendered the judgment. The Court said:
It is well settled that a judgment obtained in a court of one State cannot be enforced in the courts and against a citizen of another, unless the
court rendering the judgment has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant by actual service of process upon him,.or by his voluntary appearance
to the suit and submission to that jurisdiction. Such a judgment may be
perfectly valid in the jurisdiction where rendered, and enforced there
even against the property, effects, and credits of a non-resident defendant
there situated, but it cannot be enforced or made the foundation of an
action in another State. A law which substitutts constructive for actual
notice, is binding upon persons domiciled within the State where such
law prevails, and as respects the property of others there situated, but
can bind neither person nor property beyond its limits. This rule is
based upon international law, and upon that natural protection which
every country owes to its own citizens. It concedes the jurisdiction of the
court to the extent of the State where the judgment is rendered, but upon
the principle that it would be unjust to its own citizens to give effect to
the judgments of a foreign tribunal against them when they had no
opportunity of being heard, its validity is denied.

Publicists concur that domicile generally determines the
particular territorial jurisprudence to which every individual
is subjected. As correctly said by Mr. Wharton, the nationality of our citizens is that of the United States, and by the
laws of the United States they are bound in all matters in
which the United States are sovereign; but in other matters,
their domicile is in the particular State, and that determines
the applicatory territorial jurisprudence. A foreign judgment is impeachable for want of personal service within the
jurisdiction of the defendant, this being internationally
essential to jurisdiction in all cases in which the defendant

OPINION OF THE COURT.

is not a subject of the State entering judgment, and it is
competent for a defendant in an action on a judgment of a
sister State, as iitan action on a foreign judgment, to set up,
-as a defense, want of jurisdiction, in that he was not an inhabitant of the State rendering the judgment, and had not
been served with process, and did not enter his appearance:
Whart., Confl. Laws, §§ 32, 654, 66o; Story, Confl. Laws,
§§ 539, 540, 586.
John Benge was a citizen of Maryland when he executed
this obligation. The subject-matter of the suit against him
in Pennsylania was merely the determination of his personal liability, and it was necessary to the validity of the
judgment at least elsewhere that it should appear from the
record that he had been brought within the jurisdiction of
the Pennsylvania court by service of process, or his voluntary appearance, or that he had in some manner authorized
the proceeding. By the bond in question he authorized
"any attorney of any court of record in the State of New
York, or any other State, to confess judgment against him
(us) for the said sum, with release of errors," etc. But the
record did not show, nor is it contended, that he was served
with process, or voluntarily appeared, or that judgment was
confessed by an attorney of any court of record of Pennsylvania. Upon its face, then, the judgment was invalid, and
to be treated as such when offered in evidence in the Maryland court. It is said, however, that the judgment was
entered against Benge by a prothonotary, and that the prothonotary had power to do this under the statute of Pennsylvania of February 24, I8o6: Laws Pa. 18o5-6, p. 347This statute was proved as a fact upon the trial in Maryland, and may be assumed to have authorized the action'
taken, though under Connay v. Halstead (1873, 73 Pa. 354,
that may, perhaps, be doubtful. And it is argued that the
statute, being in force at the time this instrument was executed, should be read into it and considered as forming a
part of it, and therefore that John Benge had consented that
judgment might be thus entered up against him without
service of process or appearance in person or by attorney.
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But we do not think that a citizen of another State than
Pennsylvania can be thus presumptively held to knowledge
and acceptance of particular statutes of the latter State.
What Benge authorized was a confession of judgment by
any attorney of any court of record in the State of New
York or any other State, and he had a right to insist upon
the letter of the authority conferred. By its terms, he did
not consent to be bound .by the local laws of every State in
the Union relating to the rendition of judgment against
their own citizens without service or appearance, but, on the
contrary, made such appearance a condition of judgment
And even if judgment could have been entered against him,
not being served and not appearing in each of the States of
the Union, in accordance with the laws therein existing
upon the subject, he could not be held liable upon such
judgment in any other State than that in which it was so
rendered, contrary to the laws and policy of such State.
The courts of Maryland were not bound to hold this judgment as obligatory either on the ground of comity or of
duty, thereby permitting the law of another State to override their own. No color'to any other view is given by our
decisions inJohnsorz v. Elevator Co. (1886), i19 U. S. 388,
400, and Hopkins v. Orr (1888), 124 Id. 510, cited for
plaintiff in error. Those cases involved the rendition of
judgments against sureties on restitution and appeal bonds if
judgment went against their principals, and the sureties
signed with reference to the particular statute under which
each bond was given, nor did, nor could, any such question
arise therein as that presented in the case at bar.
Judgment affirmed.
The principal case suggests for

TIONI. Full Faith and Credit shall

consideration the question, how far
and to what extent a judgment
confessed in one of the States of
the Union is binding upon the defendant in the courts of a sister'
State, and an examination of the
cases thereon.
Article IV of the Constitution of
the United States provides: "Szc-

be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedingsshall
be proved, and the Effect thereof."
See also the Fourteenth Amendnent, Section i, ante, page 69.

FOREIGN CONFESSED JUDGMENTS.
Statutory Provisions.
Pursuant to the power given by
the above Article of the Constitution, Congress passed and the President approved, on the twentysixth day of May, 1790, "An act
to prescribe the mode in which the
public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings in each State, shall be
authenticated so as to take effect in
every other State," as follows:
[but note that the words in italic
appear in Rev. Stat. U. S. ? 905;
the words in roman are there
omitted, the bracketed words being
inserted in their place.] "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representativesofthe UnitedStates
ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
That the acts of the legislatures of
the several states [legislature of any
State or Territory, or of any country subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States,) shallbe authenticated by heving the seal of their
respective states [seals of such
State, Territory, or country,]
affixed thereto: That the records
and judicial proceedings of the
courts of any State [or Territory]
shall beproved or admitted in any
other court within the United
States, by the attestation of the
clerk, and the seal of the, court annexed, if there be a seal, together
with a certificateof hejudge, chief
justice, orpresidingmagistrate,as
the case may be, that the said attestation is in due form. And the
said records and judicial proceedi;.'gs [so] authenticatedas aforesaid,
shall have such faith and credit
given to them in everycourt within
the United States, as they have by
law or usage in the courts of the
Stalefrom whence the said records
are or shall be [which they are]
taken": i Stat. at Large, ch. iI,
VoL. XXX-I9

page 122.

On the twenty-seventh day of
March, 18o4, a supplementary act
was passed, as follows: [here, too,
it is to be obs&ved that the words .
in italic appear in Rev. Stat. U. S.
9o6 ; the words inroman are there
omitted, the-bracketedwords taking
their place.] "zBe it enacted by the
Senate and House of Representalives of the UnitedSlates of America in Congress assembled, That
from and after the passage of this
Act, all records and exemplfications of office books, which are or
may be kept in any public office of
any State [or Territory, or of any
country subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States,] not appertaining to a court, shall beproved
or admitted in any other court or
office in any other State, [Territory,
or in any such country,] by the
attestation ofthe keeper of the said
records or books, and the seal ofhis
office, thereto annexed,ifthere be a
seal, together with a cerlifcale of
thepresidingjusticeof the court of
the county, [parish,) or district, as
the case may be, in which such
office is or may be kept; or of the
governor, the secretary of State,
the chancelloror the keeper of the
great seal of the State, [or Territory, or country], that the [said]
attestation is in due form, and by
the proper officer[s]; and [If, the
said cerlificate, if [is] given by the
presiding justice of a court, [it]
shall be further authenticated, by
the clerk or prothonotary of the
said court, who shall certifrunder
his hand and the seal of his office,
that the saidpresidingjustice is
duly commissioned and qualified;
or i the said certificate be given
by the governor, the secrelary of
State, the chancellor or keeper of
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the great seal, it shall be under the
great seal of the State, [Territory,
or country aforesaid] in which the
said certificate [it] is made. And
the said records and exemplificationy, [so] authenticated as aforesaid shallhave suchfaith and credit
given to them in every court and
office within the United States, as
they have by law or usage in tMe
courts or offices of the State [Territory, or country as aforesaid,] froni
whence the same are or shall be
[which they are] taken.
"S;c. 2. And be it further enacted, That all the provisions of
this Act, and the Act to which "this
is a supplement, shall apply as
well to the public acts, records,
office books, judicial proceedings,
courts and offices of the respective
territories of the United States,
and countries subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, as to
the public acts, records, office
books, judicial proceedings, courts
and offices of the several States" :
2 Stat. at Large, ch. 56, page 298.
Judicial Construction.
The' construction to be placed
upon the Fourth Article of the Constitution, and the Acts passed thereunder, was considered by Justice
STORY, in iiillsv. Duryee (1813),
7 Cranch (iiU. S.) 481, where the
question was, whether nil debet was
a good plea to an action of debt
brought in the courts of the District of Columbia on a judgment
rendered in acourt of r~cord of the
State of New York: "The decision
of this question depends altogether
upon the construction of the Constitution and thd laws of the United
Staths. * * The actdeclaresthat,
the record duly authenticated shall
have such faith and credit as ifhas
in the State court from whence it
is taken. If in such court it has

the faith and credit of evidence of
the highest nature, viz: recordevidence, it must have the same faith
and credit in every other court.
Congress have therefore declared
the effect of the record by declaring
what faith and credit shall be given
to it. It remains only then to inquire in every case what is theeffect of, a judgment in the State
where it is rendered. In thle pres-.
ent case the defendant had full -notice of the suit, for he was arrested
and gave bail, and it is beyond all
doubt that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York was con-,
clusive upon the parties in that
State. It must therefore be conclusivehere also: *
Thewords
oftheAct * * extend'toevery
court within the United States.' 2
The doctrine thus announced and
the construction thus applied were
approved of and affirmed by Chief
Justice MARSHALL, in Hamiton v.
.O1PConnel (i8M8), 3 Wheat. (i6 U.
S.) 234.
It is, however, a well established
principle of law, and it has been
judiciously decided, not only by the
State courts, but also by the Supreme Court of the United States,
notwithstanding the above provisions in the Constitution of the
United States, and the Acts of Congress passed in pursuance thereof,
that in order to make the judgment
of a court binding upon a defendant, the court must have jurisdiction, and that the judgment rendered may be questioned,by the
defendantin a collateralproceeding,
upon the ground of want ofjuris,
diction over the person or subject
mattez of the action, uad further
that the judgment of the court of a
sister State against a non-resident
defendant in an action for money is
invalid unless the defendant beper-
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sonally served with the process of tend to overthrow the old rule by
the court, or unless he appear to
the enactment that such faith and
credit should be given to records of
the action. Thus in D'Arcy v.
Ketchum (i85o), it How. (52 U. S.) judgments as they had in the State
i65, Gossip and D'Arcy were sued,
where made."
The doctrine is thus stated by
with others, by Ketchum in the
Superior Court of the City of New Justice CURTIS in The Lafayette InYork; Gossip being served with surance Co. v. French el al. (1855),
18 How. (59 U. S.) 4o4: "Notwithprocess, but not D'Arcy, who was a
standing the Act of Congress,
citizen of Louisiana. Judgment
whenever an action is brought in
was rendered against both of them,
one State on a judgment recovered
and suit brought thereon against
the defendant D'Arcy in the United in another, it is not enough to
States Circuit Court for the Dis- show it to be valid in the State
trict of Louisiana, by way of peti- where it was rendered; it must
also appear that the defendant was
tion, upon which the Court found
against the defendant D'Arcy, who either personally within the jurissued out a writ of error to the diction of the State, or had legal
notice of the suit, and was in some
United States Supreme Court,
where the judgment was reversed way subject to its laws, so as to be
bound to appear and contest the
in an opinion by Justice CATRON,
suit, or suffer a judgment by dewho, after citing Section I of Article
IV of the Constitution of the United fault. In more general terms, the
doctrine of this Court, as well as of
States, the Act of May 26, 1790, and
the case of Mills v. Duryee, supra, the Courts of many of the States, is,
page 29o, remarked: "The inter- that this Act of Congress was not
designed to displace that principle
national law as it existed among
the States in 1790, was that ajudg- of natural justice which requires a
ment rendered in one State, assum- person to have notice of a suit before he can be conclusively bound
ing to bind the person of a citizen
of another, was void within the for- by its result; nor those rules of
public law which protect persons
eign State, when the defendant
had not been served with process and property within one State from
or voluntarily made defense, be- the exercise of jurisdiction over
cause neither the legislative juris- them by another. [This was a case
diction, nor that of courts ofjustice where the laws of Ohio declared
had binding force. Subject to this that service on the agent of a foreign insurance company should be
established principle, Congress also
legislated; and the question is,
effectual as upon the principal.
Such service was made and judgtvaether it was intended to overment obtained. Upon this judgthrow this principle, and to declare
ment, a suit was begun in Indiana
a new rule, which would bind the
citizens of one State to the laws of
and the judgment held to be valid.
So in Thomfison v. Whitman
another; as must be the case if the
laws of New York bind this defend- (1873'), 18 Wall. (85 U. S.) 457,
ant in Louisiana. There was no where Whitman, a citizen of New
evil in this part of the existing law, York, sued Thompson, a citizen of
and no remedy called for, and in New Jersey, in trespass for carryour opinion Congress did not in- ing away his sloop, the defendant
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pleading justification ,under the
"Oyster Law" of New Jersey
(April i6, 1846), to which the plaintiff took issue and challenged the
jurisdiction of the justice. On
the trial the defendant produced a
record of the proceedings before
the justices, stating that the seizure
was made in New Jersey, and relied
upon the Constitution and the Acts
of Congress, asserting that the
record was conclusive both as to
the jurisdiction and the merits of
the case.
The Court, however,
held that the record was only
prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. To this the defendant excepted, and Justice BRA.nit
in affirming the Court below,
quoted the language of Chief Justice MARsHmr.e
in Rose v. Himely
(i8o8), 4 Cranch (8 U. S.) 269, that,
"Upon principle, it would seem
that the operation of every judgment must depend on the power of
the Court to render that judgment;
or in other words, on its jurisdiction over the subject matter which
it has determined. In some cases
that jurisdiction unquestionably depends as well on the state of the
thing, as on the constitution of the
court. If by any means whatever
a prize court should be induced to
condemn, as prize of war, a vessel
which was never captured, it could
not be contended that this condemnation operated a change of
property. Upon principle, then,
it would seem that, to a certain extent, the capacity ofOhe court td
act upon the thing condemned,
arising from is being within, or
without their jurisdiaion as well as
the constitution of the court, may
be considered by that tribunal
which is to decide upon the effect
ofthesentence." Justice BRADLEY
also quoted Chief Justice BaAsLyv

ia Mackay el al. v. Gordon el al.
(1870), 34 N. J. Law 286, as follows:
" Every independent government
is at liberty to prescribe its own
methods ofjudicial process, and to
declare by what forms parties shall
be brought before its tribunals.
But, in the exercise of this power,
no government, if it desires extraterritorial recognition of its acts
can violate those rights which are
universally esteemed fundamental
and essential to society. Thus a
judgment by the court of a State
against a citizen of such State, in
his absence, and without any notice, express or implieAt, would, it
is presumed, be regarded in every
external jurisdiction as absolutely
Such
void and unenforceable.
would certainly be the case if such
judgment was so rendered against
the citizen of a foreign State."
To these sentimentsJustice BRAD
LZvY added, that "On the whole, we
think it clear that the jurisdiction
of the Court by which a judgment
is rendered in any State, may be
questioned in a collateral proceeding in another State, notwithstanding the provision of the Fourth Article of the Constitution and the
law of 179o, and notwithstanding
the averments contained in the
record itself."
In Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 5
Otto (95 U. S.) 714, suitwas brought
to recover possssion of a tract of
land, the plaintiff claiming title by
a liatent from the United States,
and the defendant under a sheriff's
deed made upon a sale of the property on execution issued under a
judgment recovered against the
plaintiff, upon the validity of which
judgment the case turned. It
appeared that the defendant in
such action, the plaintiff here,
being at the time a non-resident of
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the State, was *not personally
served with the process, and not
appearing, judgment- was taken
upon his default in not answering
upon service by publication. In
the course of the opinion, Justice
FiELD said: "The force and effect
of judgments rendered against nonresidents without personal service
of -process upon them, or their
voluntary appearance, have been
the subject of frequent consideration ip the courts of the United
States and of the several States, as
attempts have been made to enforce
such judgments in States other
than those in which they were
rendered, under the provisions of
the Constitution requiring that Ifull
faith and credit shall be given in
each State to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings
of every other State;' and the act
of Congress providing for the
mode of authenticating such acts,
records and proceedings, and declaring that, when thus authenti, cated, 'they shall have such faith
and credit given to them in every
court within the United States as
they have by law or usuge in the
courts of the State from which
they are or shall be taken.' In the
earlier cases, it was supposed that
the act gave to all judgments the
same effect in other States which
they had by law in the State where
rendered. But this view was afterwards qualified so as to make the
act applicable only when the Court
rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the parties and of the
subject matter, and not to preclude
an inquiry into the jurisdiction of
the Court in which the judgment
was rendered, or the right of the
State itself to exercise authority
over the person or the subjeet matter." After citing and approving
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the cases of D'Arcy v. Ketchum
and Thompson v. Whitman, supra,
the learned Judge continued: "In
all cases brought in the State and
Federal Courts, where attempts
have been made under the act of
Congress to give effect in one State
to personal judgments rendered in
another State against non-residents,.
without service upon them, or
upon substituted service by publication, or in some other form, it
has been held, without an exception, so far as we are aware, that
such judgments were without any
binding force, except as to property, or interests in property,
within the State, to reach and
affect which was the object of the
action in which the judgment was
rendered, and which property was
brought under control of the Court
in connection with the process
against the person. The proceeding in such case, though in the
form of a personal action, has been
uniformly treated, where service
was not obtained, and the party
did not voluntarily appear, as effectual and binding merely as a proceeding in rem, and as having no
operation beyond the disposition of
the property or some interest
therein. * * Since the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted on the
ground that proceedings in a Court
of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of
parties over whom the Court has
no jurisdiction, do not constitute
due process of law. Whatever
difficulty may be dxperienced in
giving to these terms a definition
which will embrace every permissible exertion of power affecting
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private rights, and exclude such as
is forbidden, there can be no doubt
of their meaning when applied to
judicial proceedings. They then
mean a course of legal proceedings
according to those rules and principles which have been establis1 ed
in our systems of ju-isprudence for
the protection and enforcement of
private rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must
be a tribunal competent by its constitution-that is, by the law of its
creation-to pass upon the subject
matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determination of
the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its
jurisdiction by service of process
within the State, or his voluntary
appearance. Except in cases affecting the personal status of the
plaintiff, and cases in which that
mode of service may be considered
to have been assented to in advance, as hereinafter mentioned,
the substituted service of process
*
*
by publication, allowed by the
laws in other States, where actions
are brought against non-residents,
is effectual only where, in connection with process against the person
for commencing the action, property in the State is brought under
the control of the court, and subjected to its disposition by process
adapted to that purpose, or where
judgment is sought as a means of
reaching such property or affecting
some interest therein; in other
words, where the action is in the
nature of a proceeding in rein. As
stated by Cooley in his treatise
on Constitutional LImitatiois [3d
ed, 405; 6th ed, 499], for any
other purpose 'than to subject the
property of a non-resident to valid
claims against him in the State
'.due process of law would require

appearance or personal service before the defendant would be personally bound by any judgment
rendered.' " After stating that the
Court did "not mean to 'assert,
* * that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the
statusof one of its citizens towards
a non-resident, which would be
binding within the State, though
made without service of process or
personal notice to the non-resident," he remarked: "Neither do
we mean to assert that a State may
not require a non-resident entering
into a partnership or association
within its limits, or making contracts enforceable there, to appoint
an agent or representative in the
State to receive service of process
and notice in legal proceedings instituted with respect to such partnership, association, or contracts,
or to designate a place where such
service may be made and notice
given, and provide upon their failure, to make such appointment or
to designate such place that service
may be made upon a public officer
designated for that purpose, or in
some other prescribed way, and
that judgments rendered upon such
service may not be binding upon
the non-resident, both within and
without the State."
ConfessedJudgments.
From the above, the question
presents itself, do the rules and
doctrines established by the foregoing cases apply to a judgment
confessed by virtue of a warrant or
power of attorney when the defendant, a non-resident of the State
wherein the judgment is entered,
has neither been served with process or voluntarily appeared in the
action? Thepointdoes not, except
asappearsbytheprincipal iaseseem
to have bein decided by the Su-
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preme Court of the United States, test the suit, or suffer a judgment
nor do the opinions therein de- by default." The dissenting opinlivered contain any, dicta directly ion of Justice DEPUz in Elasser v.
in point. It is, however, submitted
Haines (1889), 52 N. J. Law io,
that the above decisions, when read
infra, adopts this rule.
in conjunction with the principal
These doctrines naturally lead to
case, show that every defendant
the consideration of the question:
must be brought within the juris- Has a defendant who has executed
diction of the Court either by per- a warrant of attorney or other insonal service of the process upon strument authorizing the entry and
him, or voluntary appearance by
confession of a judgment against
him, otherwise the judgment will him, assented to, and brought him-self within the jurisdiction of the
have no binding effect in a sister
State, and that the Act of Congress
court in such a manner as will
has no effect upon this general
estop him from inquiring into the
principle of international law as it jurisdiction on the ground of want
ofservice or non-appearance? The
existed between the States prior to
Supreme Court of the United States
the passing of the Act: D'Arcy v.
has held that "The States * *
Ketchum, supra. Moreover the
are left to regulate trials in their
Courts have said, that although
each independent government may own way ;" that "due process of
prescribe its own method of law is process due according to the
law of the land;" and that "this
judicial process, yet it cannot by so
process in the States is regulated
doing (if its acts are to be recogby the law of the State": Chief
nized out of its jurisdiction, that is
Justice NVAIT
in
Walker v.
to say, in the Courts of a sister
State) infringe upon those rights Sauvinet (1875), 2 Otto (92 U. S.)
which are universally esteemed es- 90. And it has further been decided that "the words due process
sential to society: Thompsonz v.
Vhitman, supra; AMackay et aL. v.
of law * * do not necessarily
imply a regular proceeding in a
Gordon et al., sufra.
court ofjustice, or after the manner
Due Processof Law.
of such courts": Murray's Lessee
Further, the courts have said,
that if the personal liability of the et al. v. The Hoboken Land ana
Improvement Co. (1855), 18 How.
defendant is involved, there must
(59 U. S.) 272; Davidson v. New
be a judicial proceeding within the
Orleans (1877), 6 Otto (96 U. S.)
meaning of the phrase "due process
97 ; Exparte Wall (1882), 17 Otto
of law" as used in the Fourteenth
(107 U. S.) 265.
Amendment of the Constitution of
There can be no doubt, therefore,
the United States; in other words,
but that under a State statute makthere must be service of process
within the State, or voluntary ap- ing such confessions legal, and
pearance: Pennoyerv. Neff, supra. authorizing such a method of procedure, judgments thus entered are
To use the language of Justice
CURTIS in The Lafayette Insurance valid and binding upon the defendCo. v. French et al., supra, the de- ant in the courts of such State.
Yet a distinction has been drawn
fendant must be "in some way
between the effect of a judgment
subject to its [the State's] laws, so
as to be bound to appear and con- rendered under such circumstances
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that is to say, under local laws, in
its own, and in the courts of a
sister State. This is shown from
the opinion of Chief Justice FULLER
in the principal case, supra,page
284, wherein he refers to the Pennsylvania case of Steel v. Smith
(1844), 7 W. & S. (Pa.) 447, and
cites the language of Chief Justice
GIBSON: "That
a judgment is
always regular, when there has
been an appearance by attorney,
with or without warrant, and that
it cannot be impeached collaterally
for anything but fraud or collusion,
is a municipal principle, and not
an international one having place
in a question of State jurisdiction
or sovereignty."
Therefore, although such proceedings may be
"due process of law," and valid in
their own State, the same principle
would seem to apply, and it is submitted that though they may be
conclusive under their local laws,
they are not so in the courts of a
sister State, and may be attacked
collaterally in the same manner aS
other judgments when sought to
be enforced in another State. "No
sovereignty," says Mr. STORY in
his work on Conflict of Laws, ch.
14, 539, 8th ed., page 754, "can
extend its process beyond its own
territorial limits to subject other
persons or property to its judicial
decisions. Every exertion of authority beyond this limit is a mere
nullity, and incapable of binding
such persons or property in any
other tribunal." The same principle is stated by Chief Justice
GIBSON in Steel v. Smith (1844),
7W. & S. (Pa.) 451, in speaking of
the Constitutional provisions and
the Act of Congress: "It- seems,
then, that it was not intended to
efface the lines of territorial jurisdiction for the origination of pro-

cess, but only to give extra-territorial effect to judgments of tribunals having jurisdiction of the
person or the property in the first
instance."
Local Decisions.
The decisions of the State courts
upon the question of the extra-.
territorial effect of a judgment confessed under a warrant or power of
attorney in the courts of one State,
although few in number, are not in
harmony. They have mostly arisen
upon judgments - confessed and
entered under the Pennsylvania
Statute of February 24, i8o6, supra,
page 282.

The cases hereinafter set forth
show that in the courts of the following States, such judgments, if valid,
according to the laws of the State
in whose courts they are rendered,
without service of process on, or
voluntary appearance by the defendant, are entitled to the same
force and validity in the courts of
a sister State: Alabama (inf/ra,
page 297), Arkansas (3oo), Kansas
(3o), Alissouri (303), Nebraska
(3o4), New Jersey (3o5), in proceeding upon scire facias under
special bail, though not without
dissent; Ohio (3c9), West Virginia
(3o), Wisconsin (31).
Scire Faciasagai-stSpecialBail.
A distinction has been drawn between the proceedings upon a writ
of scirefacias in special bail, and
the case of proceedings in an original suit, as the defendant in the
former case is presumed to know
and be acquainted with the record
and with the extent of his undertaking, while the defendant in the
latter does not know the record,
and is no party thereto without notice, the Court holding that in the
latter, the defendant could not be
affected without notice: Delano V.
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fore, no necessity 9f taking the
I Litt. (Ky.) 117.
The action in this case was for
same care to bring him into court,
debt founded upon a judgment renin order to subject him to his
dered in the State of Virginia, and
undertaking, as there is with rethe opinion of the Court showed:
gard to defendants in original
"that the defendant was special
actions, where the matters in conbail for another, in a suit brought
troversy are entirely et pais, and
against that person, and judgment
have never been settled, or ascerwas rendered against him; that two tained by judicial determination."
writs ofscirefaciaswere then issued
Judgment without PersonalSeragainst the now defendant, the first vice.
of which was returned not found
In Alabama, ithas been held with
and no inhabitantin ny bailiwick; respect to foreign or sister State
the second was returned no inhab- judgments, "that where the proitant in iny bailiwick; and then ceedingi appear to have been conthe judgment was rendered against
ducted conformably to the laws of
the special bail. * * * That a
the State in which they were had,
judgment rendered against a de- defense for want of jurisdiction in
fendant in any original suit, requirthe court either over the subject
ing the service of process, is void,
matter in contest, or the person of
without such service, is a proposithe defendant, can only be made by
tion to which we could not long
special plea in bar": Hunt &"
hesitate assent. * * But to this
Condry v. Mayfield (1829), 2 Stew.
general rule, like all others, there
(Ala.) 124. From this case it
may be well founded exceptions;
would appear that, if the judgment,
and the inquiry here is, ought not
be it by confession or otherwise, is
the case of scire facias against
valid and binding upon the defendspecial bail, to be one. * * This ant in the courts of the State where
beingthe judgment of a sister State,
it is rendered, he cannot take obby the Constitution of the United jection to, or avoid, it, excepting in
States, and the decision of this
the manner indicated, and therefore
Court thereupon, * * it is en- unless he has a defense pleadable in
titled to the same credence here,
bar, the courts of that State will
as it would be in the State from
uphold the judgment. In the case
whence it came. * * Very satis- just mentioned, the action was
factory reasons may be given why
brought by Hunt & Condry against
a judgment on sciye facias, after
Mayfield on a judgment against
unsuccessful diligence to- find the
him in the courts of Tennessee,
defendant, may be rendered. In
founded upon exemplifications of
'an original suit, the defendant may
the record of such recovery, the denot know of the record, and he is fendant pleading nul tiel record.
no party until notice be given him,
The plaintiffs, sureties for the payand therefore a.judgment without
ment of money by the defendant,
such notice, ought not to affect
being obliged to pay by suit and
him. A special bail cannot be a judgment against them, sought to
stranger to the original record. He
recover -the amount from their
must be presumed to be acquainted principal, the defendant, who was
with it, and with the extent of his- not served with process and entered
undertaking. * * There is, thereno appearance. In the opinion of
Jofilinfg (IS22),
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in the court, was equivalent to perthe Court in favor of the judgment,
Judge SAvroLD said. "The bill of sonal service, and to a confession
exceptions * * presents for con- in open court: Nunn v. Sturges
Here,
sideration a question of consider- el aL (i86O), 22 Ark. 389.
able magnitude. * * .The ques- upon a judgment against Nunn
tion relates to the effect of a judg- in Louisiana, Mrs. Stu-rges and
her husband brought an action
ment obtained in a sister State,
against a defendant residing out of of debt in the Circuit Court of
the same, ahdwhere there has been Drew County, in this State, in
no personal service of the process.
which judgment was given against
* * It is not our intention to exNunn, who now sued outa writ of
tend the rule of decision in this error for reversal of such judgment.
case beyond the principles neces- Nunn pleaded want of notice of
sarily involved in it; or to declare the 'action in the Louisiana court,
the kind or nature of defense which and to the jurisdiction. It appeared
would be available against a judg- that upon the petition filed in the
ment rendered in a different State Louisiana court was endorsed an
or, nation, -where there has been
acceptance ot: service, waiver of
personal service of process, the -the formality of citation, and also
proceedings conformable to the a confession of judgment in favor
laws of the country, and the record of Mrs. Sturges. Upon the procertified in due form. Here there duction of this endorsement, signed
was no personal service of the pro- by Nunn, the Court gave judgcess, or appearance by the defend- ment. The objection taken to the
ant which would have been tanta- judgment was, that the endorsemount to actual notice; the Court ment was but an admission of the
appears to have proceeded accord- debt, which could not be used in
ing to the law of that State, upon evidence, and that an opportunity
of denying the signature, or of
the ground of constructive notice,
aisingfrom the facts, that the de- pleading thereto, ought to have
been offered. In upholding the
fendant was the principal debtor in
the note * * the plaintiffs his judgment, Justice FAmcHIrw resuretie6, and thai they had paid marked: "Every thing upon the
and satisfied the same, after judg- face of the transcript of the judgment shows that it 'wasobtained in
mentobtainedagainstthemas such,
in that State. This recovery ap- a differe'nt procee~ling from any
pears to have been authorized by suit that is conducted according to
the law of that State, and in the the observances of our Courts, or
the practice of the common law,
form pursued."
It has been contended that the And as the Court was evidently
signature of the defendant to the one of superior or general jurisdicwarrant or power of attorney was tion, one that must be taken in the
but A mere admission of the debt, absence of proof to the contrary,
which could not be given in evi- to have had juriction of the subdence, and that the defendant must ject matter of the suit, we must
take it for granted, that it would
have an opportunity of pleading
not have proceeded to render judg
thereto. But the" court found that
the signature in that pariciular case, ment without first obtaining jurisdiction of the person of the debtor,
which was upon the petition-filed
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the action appearing to be a personal action. It also appears that
the Court considered the endorsement equivalent to personal service,
and to a confession of judgment, in
open Court, and we must presume
that the Court acted according to
law. * * We cannot judicially
act upon suspicion, information, or
personal knowledge of the law of
Louisiana, but comity, good sense,
and law require us to presume that
its Courts would not exercise jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, unless that jurisdiction was
acquired by reasons known to its
law; and especially when we see
an acknowledgment of the defendant, which is acted on as good personal service, and which could
have been made for nothing else,
than to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Court, and which is
an actual acknowledgment that the
plaintiff was seeking to obtain
judgment against him. * * We
cannot say but that the judgment
in Louisiana against Nunn would
be there held as a judgment upon
good notice; we believe that the
Court acted as having jurisdiction
of his person, that the judgment
was not void there, and must consequently be held to have determined that Nunn was indebted.
* * The cases * * hold that
a judgment of another State, must
have the same effect here, as where
rendered, unless the party denies
actual notice of the suit or appearance thereto, or that, as a non-resident of the State, he was not subject to special statutory modes of
notice, that have no extra-territorial
force."
So the courts have held that the
defendant, by his act in giving such
power, has submittedhimself to the
jurisdiction, and is just as much

within the power of the court as
the plaintiff, and that if a resident
of the State wherein the judgment
is obtained at the time of executing
the warrant of attorney, he must be
presumed to know the law of that
State: Ritter el al. v. Hoffman
(1886), 35 Kan. 215, infr-a.
In Weaver v. Boggs (I873), 38
Ald. 255, cited and relied upon in
the principal case, sup ra, page 286,
judgment was rendered in Pennsylvania upon two successive writs of
scirefaciasissued to revive a judgment of that State of over twenty
years old, the defendant having for
more than that period resided out
of the State, and without the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts.
In reversing the plaintiff's judgment, Justice MILrER said: "We
find there is in that State [Pennsylvania] no period of limitations prescribed by statute for the bringing
of actions upon judgments, yet it
has been distinctly announced as
the law there, that if a judgment
be suffered to stand for twenty
years, with no steps in the meantime taken to revive it or keep it
alive, in part payment and no explanation or accounting for the
delay, it is presumed to be satisfied,
and in such case that presumption
is a presumption of law, and the
fact of actual payment and satisfaction is not to be submitted as an
open question for the belief of a
jury. We have neither seen nor
been referred to any decisions of
the Courts of that State establishing the law differently." After
stating the general principle of law
upon the enforcement of judgments of the courts of one State in
those of another, as quoted by the
Chief Justice in the principal case,
supra, page 286, Justice MILLEr
continued: "This doctrine is in no
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wise affected by t'le provisions of
the Constitution of the United
States and the Acts of Congress
passed in pursuance thereof. * *
This rule has been enforced in
numerous instances and against
judgments obtained without notice
under various laws and in various
modes. Its application is to be
determined ty the circumstances
of each case as it arises. No decision has been cited applying the
rule to a judgment of revivor or
fiat on returns of nihil, without
actual service or notice, to writs of
scire facias issued and returned
while the defendant was a citizen
and resident of another State, where
jurisdiction to render the original
judgment was duly acquired by
service of process upon him. * *
That the judgment on the scire
facias was rendered without actual
notice or service of the writ cannot
be disputed, and whatever force
there may be in the argument that
a scirefaciasis a judicial, and not
an original writ, and that when a
defendant has once been summoned
to attend a court he is never discharged from the obligation to be
there and respond to its orders,
until ie has been formally discharged without day, or has satisfied the duties imposed upon hinm
by the judgment, when applied to
a case where the scire facias is
issued before the presumption of
satisfaction of the judgment from
lapse of time has arisku, it has
none when applied to a case like
this."
Validity of ConfessedJudgments.
In Arkansas, it would seem that
they would be valid, unless the defendant denies actual notice of the
suitor appearance thereto, or shows
that as a non-resident of the State
wherein the judgment is rendered,

he was not subject to special modes
of notice which have no extra-territorial effect: Nlunn v. Slurges el
al. (I86o), 22 Ark. 389, supra.
In Crafts v. Clark (174), 38 Ia.
237, the action was upon a judgment of the Court of Common
Pleas of Greene County, Pennsylvania, in favor of one Hufty, against
the defendant Clark, upon his
promissory note with warrant of
attorney empowering any attorney
in Greene County to confess judgment. In holding the judgment
valid in the State of Iowa, Justice
DAY said: "The note contains a
power of attorney authorizing any
attorney to confess judgment for
the amount thereof with costs.
The Act of the Legislature of
Pennsylvania authorized the prothonotary to enter the judgment.
The proof shows that it is customary and proper, in the State of
Pennsylvania, to enter such instrument before the instrument matures. The power of attorney to
confess judgment gave the Court
jurisdiction over the person of defendant. And under the usage and
practice in the Pennsylvania courts,
the subject matter was also within
the jurisdiction of the Court."
In Patterson et al. v. State of
Indiana (1850), 2 G. Greene (Ia.)
492, the judgmentwas recovered in
Indiana on a note with warrant of
attorney to confess judgment, and
by the present action sought to be
enforced in theState of Iowa. The
warrant of attorney was somewhat
special in its terms as it empowered
the attorney to appear, "and to
waive the issuing and service of
process, and enter his appearance,
and waive a declaration in debt
* * and confess said action." In
upholding, such judgment Chief
Justice VILLIAMS said: "By the
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power, which authorized the ap- rect. * * So far as we are
pearance by attorney, and which advised, it has never been the
was duly proved before confession,
understanding of the profession nor
the Court had jurisdiction of the of the business community in this
persons of the defendants ; the sub- State that warrants of attorneyto
ject matter was also such, that it
confess judgment had any place in
was clearly within the jurisdiction
our law. * * Parties cannot by
of the Court by which the judgment
contract made in another State
engraft upon our procedure here
was rendered,"
In the later case, however, of
remedies which our laws do not
Hamillon v. Schoenberger et al. contemplate nor authorize."
(1877), 47 Ia. 385; S. C. IS AMIERIn Rilter el al. v. HoffnTzan
(IS6), 35 Kan. 215, Hoffman as
IeAl- LAw REGISTER 263, the
petition alleged that the plaintiff, Sheriff of Columbia County, Pennresiding in Pennsylvania, had exe- sylvania, levied an execution upon
cuted his promissory note to the certain property of the defendants,
defendants, with warrant of attor- on behalf of Ritter. The property
ney empowering any attorney of was claimed by another, and there
any court of record within the being an uncertainty in the matter,
Ritter and his father gave Hoffman
United States or elsewhere, to
appear for and confess judgment *an indemnity bond, with a confesagainst the plaintiff. Subsequently
sion of judgment. The property
the defendants claimed judgment
levied upon was sold by Hoffman,
on the said note, and an attorney
who was subsequently held liable
of the Benton District Court ap- for its value, and now sought to enpeared and filed a confession of force his judgment for indemnity
judgment for the plaintiff in this against the Ritters. At the time of
suit, the defendant below, whereon
the signing of the indemnity bond
judgment was entered against him.
the Ritters resided in Pennsylvania,
The plaintiff contended that at the but afterwards removed to Kansas,
time of the confession of the judg- where Hoffman now sought to enment he was a resident of Pennsyl- force his confessed judgment. In
vania, and never authorized the holding the judgientvalid and enattorney to appear for him except
forceable in Kansas, Justice VALENby the power in the note. To this
TIN E said: "According to the evidence introduced on the trial of
petition the defendants demurred,
and in affirming the order by which
this case, the judgment rendered in
the demurrer was overruled and
Pennsylvania is absolutely good
the judgment cancelled, Chief Jus- and valid in the State of Pennsylvania; and according to the decistice DAY said: "It is claimed by
appellant that the principles of the ions rendered in Pennsylvania, we
would also think thatthe judgment
common law, authorizing a warrant
is also good and valid. A valid
of attorney to confess judgment
are in force in this State, and that judgment may be rendered in Pennsylvania upon a confession, as this
the provisions of our Code respectwas, without summons or pleadings,
ing the recovery of judgnent by
and by the clerk of the court in vaaction and confession of judgment
cation, or by the Prothonotary, as
are merely cumulative. We do
not think this proposition is cor- the clerk is called in Pennsylvania.
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It may be rendered merely upon
the personal appearance and confession of the defendant himself,
or upon the appearance and confession for the defendant by an attorney at law, duly authorized in
writing to do so by the defendant,
or upon a confession contained in
a written instrument executed by
the defendant, without any appearance by the defendant himself or
any person for him, but merely at
the request of the holder of such
instrument; and the judgment
thus rendered may be upon a debt
due, or for an agreed amount to secure a future or contingent liability,
or unascertained and unliquidated
damages.
We think the
W
only question for us to determine
in this case is, whether the jiidgment rendered in Pennsylvania is
equally as good in Kansas, as it is
in Pennsylvania. If it was rendered without jurisdiction personally of tile
defendants, of course it
would be void in Kansas; but if it
was rendered with such jurisdiction, then it would be equally as
good and valid in Kansas as it is in
Pennsylvania, for under P i, Article
IV, of the Federal Constitution,
'full faith and credit shall be given
in each State to tile
public acts,
records and judicial proceedings of
every other State.'" With regard
to the defendants' objections, inter
alia, that no summons was ever issue, and no appearance ever made
by either of the defendants; that
they were in Kansas and not in
Pennsylvania at the time the judgmeint was rendered, the same
learned Judge said: " Under the
laws of Pennsylvania, as shown by
the evidence, parol and statutory,
we think the Pennsylvania Court
rendering the judgment in the present case had jurisdiction of the per-

sons of the defendants. It is not
necessary in all cases that a summous should be issued and served
upon tileparty to the action in order to give the Court jurisdiction
over him personally. A sunons is
never issued against a plaintiff, and
still tile
court has the same jurisdiction of the plaintiff that it has of
the defendant. A volunt. ry appearance in the court is all that is required of either the plaintiff or the
defendant. Neither is it necessary
that the appehrance of the person
should be in person. It may be by
attorney. In many cases neither
the plaintiffnor the defendant ever
appear personally in tha Court, and
yet the court may have ample jurisdiction of both. A plaintiff, by the
voluntary appearance of his authorized counsel, may give such personal jurisdiction of his person to
the court that a personal judgment
rendered against him would be
valid everywhere in the United
States, although lie never in fact
made any personal appearance in
the court, nor even been in the
State where such court was held,
or such judgment rendered. He
has given such jurisdiction by
simply authorizing an attorney to
appear for him, and by the appearance of such attorney in the case.
*

*

When the defendants exe-

cuted the instrument in writing,
confessing judgment, and upon
which the Pennsylvania judgment
was rendered, they were bound to
know what the laws of Pennsylvania were, and such laws became
part of their contract, and by their
contract they surrendered jurisdiction of theinselves to thle courts of
Pennsylvania."
In illaryland, they will not be
enforced unless the deflendant be
brought within the jurisdiction of
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the court by personal service or
voluntary appearance: Weaver v.
Boggs (1873), 38 Md. 255, supra.
In Harnessv. Green'sAdministrator(1854), 19 Mo. 323, the plaintiff exhibited a demand in the
Probate Court of Daviess County,
against the estate of Green, deceased, which was allowed and
classed, and the administrator appealed to the Circuit Court, where,
upon the trial, the transcript of a
record front the Circuit Superior
Court of Hardy County, Virginia,
showing a judgment against the intestate, Green, was presented by
the plaintiff, objected to by the
defendant, but admitted by the
Court, who allowed the claim
against the estate. In affirming the
decision, Judge GAMiBLE remarked:
"The only qqestion which has
been presented for our consideration is, whether the transcript
shows a judgment by the Virginia
Court.

*

*

In

looking at

the

transcript, we are satisfied that the
judgment is to be taken to be the
judgment of the court rendered
upon a confession made in the
clerk's office. What the provisions
of the Virginia law may be, in relation to the practice in such cases,
we cannot know, as they are not
before us, and therefore we look
only at the transcript itself."
Randolpih el al. v. Keller (1855),
21 Mo. 557, was a suit upon ajudgment of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas of Sussex County, in
the State of New Jersey. The judgment was confessed by virtue of a
power given by the debtor. In upholding the judgment, Judge RLAND said: "There can be no
doubt of the effect of this judgment
in the State of New Jersey. The
proceeding is one regulated by
their Statute alone; it is one

founded on what is called a judgment bond. The obligor in the
bond empowers any attorney of
any court of record to enter and
confess judgment against him for
the debt and costs of suit. * *
The exemplification of the record
shows all the necessary acts have
been done. * * Now no matter
how general the terms of the power
of attorney be to confess judgment,
it can only be confessed on such
bonds and under such powers as
are embraced by the Statute anthorizing the proceeding; that isin
the State of New Jersey only. But
when thuseconfessed in that State,
the judgment there is declared to be
quite as good and effectual, to all
intents and purposes, asjudgments
entered by confession in the manner practiced before the Statute
was enacted. Now giving to this
judgment the effect of any regularly
confessed judgment of the courts of
New Jersey, we see at once that
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover." In this case it would appear that the power or warrant of
attorney, pursuant to which the
judgment was signed, was dated
from Easton, in the State of Pennsylvania, and empowered any attorney of any court of record in the
United States to confess judgment,
and upon this ground Judge ScoTT
dissented from the foregoing opinion, stating that it was "not a
record or judicial proceeding within
the Constitution of the United
States. * * Ifjudgment thus obtained shall be regarded as records
and judicial proceedings within the
meaning of the Constitution of the
United States, that instrument will
become odious, as furnishing a
means by which the greatest injustice and oppression may be practiced.

*

*

Respectable courts
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have held that the words, 'records
and judicial proceedings,' in the
Constitution of the United States,
are words of definite meaning at
common law; that the common
law never recognizes judicial proceedings as foreign judgments, unless rendered by a court of record
upon personal notice to the defendant, or his appearance to the action;
that 'the records and judicial proceedings'
contemplated by the
Constitution, were, therefore, not
judgments rendered without notice
to the defendant or appearance to
the action, but judgments which
were recognized and wiforced at
common law on foreign judgments.
But admitting that a State, with
regard to her resident citizens, may
adopt absurd and unjust provisions,
may permit judgments on constructive notice, or whatever else she
may think fit to make notice, and
that such judgment will be enforced in the neighboring States,
yet this broad and liberal construetion of the -. ords of the Constitution will not cover this case. * *
It does not appear that any of the
parties to the suit were residents of
New Jersey, or had ever been in the
State. * * To hold that under a
power of attorney to any attorney
of any court of record in the United
States, an attorney in any State
may confess a judgment, and that
the judgment so confessed shall
have full faith and credit in all the
other States, would be giving the
Constitution a latitude of construction mischievous in itself, and one
that night lead to great oppression
and injustice."
In NVicholas v. Farwell & Co.
(1888), 24 Neb. i8o, the action was
brought on a confessed judgment
rendered by the Circuit Court of
Stark County, Illinois, against the

plaintiff, defendant below, a nonresident of that State, who claimed
that the court had no jurisdiction
of the subject-matter nor of the
person.
In affirming the judgment of the court below against
the present plaintiff, Justice COBB
said: "Counsel for plaintiff in
error cites numerous cases where
judgment has been rendered in
actions commenced by summons
and by attachment, but where no
service has been made upon the defendant, whoie liability upon the
judgment was then called in question, but they cite no case where
judgment has been rendered by
confession upon cognovil. The
method of taking judgment by confession on what are familiarly
known as judgment notes, has long
been in common use in the State of
Illinois and other States. But few
questions arising under it have
come before the Courts, chiefly for
the reason that the debtor party,
by signing and delivering the in-strument, by its terms cuts himself
off from all defenses except that of
fraud in the procuring of the contract. It is, nevertheless, necessary that the proceedings be in due
form of law, and where such judgment is entered in vacation, the defendant may apply to the Courts,
when in session, to have the order
vacated, and from the decision of
the Court on that application, the
parties may prosecute error to the
Supreme Court." With regard to
the form of the power of attorney,
by virtue of which the appearance
was entered and judgment confessed, which was in the usual
forni, not containing the name of
any particular person as attorney,
the same learned Judge said: "A
rule requiring them to do so would,
in a great measure, destroy their
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convenience and usefulness as circulating paper; and the legality
of the form used has never been
successfully questioned to my
knowledge. Upoh this form it is
competent for any attorney of the
Court in which the judgment is
sought, to enter the appearance of
the signer of the judgment note as
defendant, and in his name and
stead perform every act necessary
to the rendition of a binding personal judgment against him. To
this end it is not necessary that the
defendant be personally present in
Court, nor that he be in the State;
ncr, indeed, that lie should have
ever have been in the State. The
cases cited by counsel for plaintiff
in error are, many of them, where
a party having obtained judgment
against another, without legal service, and, of course, without an
appearance on the part of the defendant, either in person or by
attorney, brought suit on such
judgment in another State. Of
course, in such cases, it has been
held that nothing short of personal
service within the State of the
forum would confer iurisdiction to
render a personal judgment which
would support an action in another
State. This is doubtless the law,
but it sheds no light upon the question now before us."
In New Jersey, except in the
case of proceedings upon writ of
scirefaciason special bail, it would
seem that such proceedings will
not be binding without proof
of personal service or voluntary
appearance: Elasser v. Haines
(i889)..52 N. J. Law io. This was a
case where the plaintiff obtained
a judgment in the District Court
for the City and County of Philadelphia against one Owens, upon
Vol.. 111-20

which afierifaciasissued. Afterwards the defendant came before
the court and acknowledged himself to be bound for the amount
upon condition of Owens not paying the same within a given time.
The payment not being satisfied,
the plaintiff issued two writs of
scire facias, which were returned
ni/il habel, whereupon judgment
was entered against the defendant
upon his recognizance. To this the
defendant pleaded vron actio; not
being served with the process, and
not appearing; that lie was not
within the jurisdiction of the court
at any time pending the suit, or
when judgment was rendered, and
contended that although the judgment might be valid in Pennsylvania, yet for these reasons it was
not binding upon him outside of
that State. This contention was,
however, met by Chief Justice
BEAsLEY in the following language: "Inasmuch as the judgment referred to has all the effect
of a judgment in personam, there
can be no doubt touching the correctness of this position, if the fact
upon which it rests be conceded.
The declaration in the Constitution
of the United States, 'that full
faith and credit shall be given in
each State to the public acts,
records and judicial proceedings of
every other State,' and the Act of
Congress supplementing this provision, does not apply to the instance of a general judgment
against a person over whom the
court has no judicial authority.
This doctrine is so absolutely settled by a train of decisions in both
the Federal and State Courts that it
must be assumed as an admission
in every discussion of the subject.
Therefore, the only point for de-
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cision in the present case, relating
necessity legalize the entry of this
to this subject, is whether the judg- statutory judgment.
* * The
ment now in question is one of English common law forns the
those just mentioned; that is, a ju- basis of American jurisprudence,
dicial determination against a per- and for my part, I am ready to
son with respect to whom the adopt as an axiom that every j udgcourt has no right of judicature.
ment rendered in the court of a
The suit in question was based
State in a civil proceeding, accordupon a recognizance, the procedure
ing to that system, and with the asbeing two successive writs of scire sent of the local law, must by force
facias returned vil habet, and judg- of the Federal Constitution and
ment thereupon. This was plainly
Statute, be accepted by the
a proceeding in conformity with tribunals of every other State as
the practice of the common law.
possessed of an unquestionable leConsequently it will be observed
gality. It is not perceived that
that the proposition upon which
this broad proposition, in the most
the defense rests is this: that all distant degree, conflicts with anyjudgments obtained by force of this thing that is possessed of judicial
ancient method were coram non authority." From this finding in
jedice, and therefore absolutely
favor of the judgment, Justice
void. * * The great importance
DiPuE dissented and held that
of this question is obvious; for if it
"There is nothing in the nabe true that a judgment entered
ture of a recognizance that will
against a defendant in his absence,
take a judgment in personam upon
in the old mode or its equivalent,
it, out of the rule that a judgment
is a proceeding in a court devoid of
in Personam without a voluntary
all jurisdiction in the matter, the appearance or service of process, is
result must be that all these various
a nullity. * * The extra-terrirecognizances are unenforceable as
torial nullity of a judgment in perlong as the conusor absents himself sonam, without jurisdiction over
from the State in which they were
the person, no longer stands excluentered into. Such a doctrine must
sively on principles of international
necessarily abrogate all the statu- law. The Fourteenth Amendment
tory tegulations that exist in this
to the Federal Constitution, as inState on the subject. * * In- terpreted by the Supreme Court of
quiry relates altogether to the the United States, prescribes a rule
question whether, ender the cir- which in other courts is final and
cumstances presented, the District
conclusive. As construed by that
Court of Philadelphia by force of
tribunal, the tern ' due process of
the procedure adoptedl, had such law,' in the Constitutional Amendjurisdiction over the person of the meat, when applied to judicial
defendant as to warrant the rendiproceedings, means a course of
tion of the judgment now before legal proceedings according to
us.
It would seem self-evident
those rules and principles which
that if such jurisdiction existed, so
have been established for the proas to validate the entry of a comtection and enforcement of private
mon law judgment awarding an
rights, and that to give such proexecution, the same scope of cog- ceedings any validity there must
nizance over the person would of
be a competent tribunal to pass
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i
upon the subject matter; and if ment. In reversing the judgment
that involves a determination of and ordering a new trial, Justice
the personal liability of the defend- WILLIAMxS, after citing the first
ant, he must be brought within its
section of the Fourth Article of the
jurisdiction by service of process
Constitution of the United States,
and the Act of Congress, said: "The
within the State, or by his voluntary appearance; that, where the copy of the judgment offered and
suit is in personam, substituted ser
received in evidence was properly
vice by publication or otherwise is
authenticated under this Statute,
ineffectual. * * The defendant's
ana the judgment was thereby
appearance to enter into the recogproved, and was entitled to have
nizance gave the Court jurisdiction
the effect prescribed therefor by the
to make his contract of record, and
Statute, provided the attestation by
a prothonotary can be regarded as
to proceed upon it in rem against
the defendant's property within its
that of a clerk, within the meaning
jurisdiction, according to the law of the Statute. It does not appear,
and practice of the Court, but did except from the papers themselves,
not confer jurisdiction to enter a
what the office of prothonotary in
judgment in fiersonam which was Pennsylvania is. The certificate
by the presiding judge states that
capable of having any force or effect
in another jurisdiction."
the person who made the attestaIn New York, the courts have tion is prothonotary of the Court of
held, but not without dissent, that Common Pleas, duly commissioned
the statutes under which such judg- and qualified, to all whose acts as
ments are given validity in the such full faith and credit are and
ought to be given, and that the
State court where rendered, must
be proven, and it must be shown
attestation is in due form. Very
likely it is true that what is meant
that jurisdiction of the person was
acquired thereby, as the court will
in the Statute by the word clerk, is
termed in and by the law of Pennnot assume the legality of such
procedure: Trebilcox v. jAlfrAine,
sylvania aprothonolary. The quesExr. &c. (887), 46 Hun. (N. Y.)
tion is, whether the courts of this
469; Teelv. Yost (88 9 ), 56 N. Y. State have the right to assume this
S. Ct. 456, iifra.
without proof of the Statute of
In Trebilcoxr v. ATcAlpine,
Exr. Pennsylvania. A prothonotary is
&c. (1887), 46 Hun. (N. Y.) 469, defined by Webster as, among other
the point under consideration was things, a chief clerk or register of
raised upon appeal from a judg- a court in some of the United
ment entered in Rensselaer County
States. * * We incline to the
opinion the Court has the right to
upon an order confirming the report
of a referee, the claim being the
presume the prothonotary is the
chief clerk of the court in quesamount of a judgment against the
tion, and is therefore the proper
deceased in his lifetime entered in
a Court of Common Pleas of Pennperson, under the United States
sylvania upon a promissory note Statute, to make the attestation in
with a power of attorney to the question. We are left then to
prothonotary or any attorney of inquire what effect is to be given to
any court of record in Pennsvlva- the judgment in question in the
nia, or elsewhere, to confess judg- courts of this State. It will be
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observed that the Statute requires
such full faith and credit to be
given to such judgments as they
have by law or usage in the Courts
of the State from which they are
taken. We have in this case no
evidence as to the statute law or
the usage of the State of Pennsylvania, and we cannot assume the
statute law is the same as that of
our own State, nor can we assume
what such statute law and usage
are. * - We may very likely
assume the law, other than statute
law, is the same in Pennsylvania
as in our own State. * * We
may assume, therefore, that this
judgment had no binding effect in
the State of Pennsylvania, unless
the Court which rendered it had
jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the person of the defendant,
and unless it was free from fraud.
Indeed, it is well settled, aside
from this presumption, that ajudgment of a sister State may always
be attacked for want of jurisdiction
or for fraud. * * The judgment
was recovered and entered concededly without the personal appearance in court of the testatrix,
and without the service of any
summons or other paper upon her,
or the commencement of any action
against her. It was recovered and
entered by virtue of the authority
contained in the note (so called)
itself. It is objected that it thus
appears no jurisdiction was obtained by the Court of 'the person
of the testatrix. The general rule
is, that a person must have notice,
or must appear, in order to give
the Court jurisdiction of the person, and to authorize the recovery
and entry of judgment.
Very
likely there may be a statute in the
State of Pennsylvania authorizing
the recovery and entry of a judg-

CO. V.
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ment upon such a note as the one
in question without appearance or
notice to the makers, without any
proof by acknowledgment or otherwise that the note was ever executed by the persons whose names
appear signed thereto as makers.
But we have no proof that such a
statute exists, and we cannot presume it in the absence of proof
[sic]. Such a judgment could not
be recovered or entered in the
courts of this State under our
Statute ; and' even if we are to
presume the laws of Pennsylvania
were the same as our own, we
should be compelled to hold that
there was no jurisdiction obtained,
and that the judgment was void.
The manner of recovering the
judgment seems to have been by
merely filing the note, and no proof
being made or given as to its execution, a judgment -was entered as
a matter 6f course. We cannot say
or presume, in the absence of the
statute law of Pennsylvania, that
any faith or credit whatever would
be given by law or usage to such a
judgment in the Courts of Pennsylvania."
From this judgment, so far as
the question of the jurisdiction of
the Pennsylvania court was concerned, Justice LANDON dissented

in the following language: "We
can see from the record that the
Court adjudged from the language
of the note itself and from the
State in which it was made, and
from its presentation and filing on
behalf of the plaintiff with the prothonotary of the Court, that the
makers of the note thereby admitted the jurisdiction of the Court
of their persons and of the subject
matter. We cannot say there was
no evidence tending to show jurisdiction. If there was the slightest
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evidence tending to show jurisdiction, the adjudication of the Court
that it had jurisdiction is final. It
could only be challenged as error,
and error must be reviewed on
appeal. It is of no consequence
that we would hold in our Courts,
that the evidence there submitted
was too weak, or too loosely verified to justify an adjudication of
jurisdiction of the persons of the
makers of the note. Because there
was some evidence tending to show
such jurisdiction, the decision of
the Pennsylvania court that it had
jurisdiction, is binding upon us."
In Teelv. Yost (1889), 56 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 456, the action was
brought upon a judgment recovered
in Pennsylvania by the plaintiff
against the defendant, upon the
latter's promissory note, with warrant of attorney authorizing any
attorney of any court of record in
Pennsylvania, or elsewhere, to conThere was no
fess judgment.
record of any process or plea, nor
of any service or appearance by
the defendant, and at the time of
entry nothing was due on the note.
There was no adjudication of the
court for payment, or that plaintiff
should have execution or process of
any kind to collect anything. But
the plaintiff offered in evidence an
exemplified copy of a portion of
the record. In reversing the judgment and granting a new trial, Justice IxGRAHA~m said: "It seems to
me that this record was not evidence of any judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant for any sum of money, and
would not justify a presumption
that any question was adjudicated
between the parties. The first
requisite of a judgment was wanting. A judgment is defined to be
'a conclusion of law upon facts

found or admitted by the parties or
upon a default in the course of a
suit ; a decision or sentence of the
law given by a court of justice or
other competent tribunal as the result of proceedings instituted therein for the redress of an injury':
Bouvier's Law Dictionary. In the
absence of the process to bring the
defendant before the Court, and of
an order or decree which is an adjudication, and with no proof of
the law or practice of Pennsylvania
which provided that such a record
was in effect an adjudication, [sic]
the evidence was insufficient to
prove that the plaintiff had recovered a judgment against the
defendant."
Sipesv. Whitney&'Bowen (I876),
3o Ohio St. 69, was an action to recover ajudgment on a transcript of
what purported to be the record of
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
the defendant herein, and against
the defendants, in the Court of
Common Pleas of Bedford County,
Pennsylvania. The judgment was
confessed and signed in vacation
pursuant to a power of attorney,
and entered by the prothonotary
under the Pennsylvania Statute.
It was contended by the plaintiff
that the records did not disclose
the fact that they were "judicial
proceedings," within the meaning
of the Constitution of the United
States, and the Act of Congress, and
that the record showed that the attorneys who confessed the judgment for the plaintiff here, the defendant below, were also the attorneys for the defendant here, the
plaintiff below. In upholding the
judgment, Justice JOHNSON said:
"It may now be regarded as settled that the judgments of courts
of record of sister States are entitled
to full faith and credit in every
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and effect as if a declaration had
other State, when duly authenbeen filed and judgment confessed
ticated as required by Act of Conby an attorney, or as if obtained in
gress, and that in an action brought
thereon in another State, the juris- open court and in term time. By
the Statute, a judgment on a wardiction of the State rendering the
rant of attorney, rendered in vacasame over the subject matter and
tion before a prothonotary, is as
the person are the only questions
open for inquiry. If the jurisdic- valid in that State as if a declaration had been filed and a regular
tion of the court is not impeached
confession made by an attorney, or
in either respect, and the judgment
as if obtained in open court in term
is, by the laws and usages of the
time. * * The Statute gave the
State where rendered, a valid and
prothonotary power to enter up
conclusive determination of the
such judgment, and the defendant's
rights of the parties, it is equally
warrant of attorney gave the Court
conclusive in every other State,
and, as a judicial proceeding, is en- jurisdiction over the person. The
record, when made up, became the
titled to full faith and credit. It is
official evidence of the judicial proconceded that by the law of Pennsylvania, these are valid judgments ceedings of the Court, as certified,
and not the acts of the clerk. In
in that State, but it is claimed that
accordance with this view * *
an inspection of the record shows
that they are not judicialpiroceed- a judgment of a sister State, which
appears to have been rendered by
ings of a court of that State, but
the Court on a confession before
only judgments in form confessed
before the prothonotary or clerk of the clerk in vacation is conclusive."
In Pennsylvania,the jurisdiction
the court, and not rendered by the
Court, and therefore not wvithin the of the court, in the case of an
purview of Section i, Article IV, of action on a foreign judgment
the Constitution of the United against a non-resident, may be enStates. - * To assume that these quired into collaterally, and a judgment by confession will be opened,
proceedings are not the solemn
if the defendant can show a good
adjudications of the Court, by one
defense at law or in equity: Steel v.
of its officers, duly authorized, is to
Smit/k (1844), 7 V. & S. (Pa.) 447,
contradict the recitals of the record
itself. Assuming, however, that supbr-a, page 284; 3lontague v. McDowell (iS82), 99 Pa. 265.
these judgments were entered in
And in Mermont, all judgments,
vacation before the prothonotary,
including those by confession, are
it does not follow that they are not
conclusive as to everything which
judicial proceedings of a court. As
might have been pleaded or given
shown, that officer had power to
enter on the records of the court, in evidence in defense, except as to
judgments by confession on war- such matter as may be pleaded in
offset: Barney v. Goff and Cady
rants of attorney, without the
(1814), 1 D. Chip. (Vt.) .304, i10-a.
agency of an attorney or declaraIn Coleman v. F'alters et al.
tion being filed, and it is made his
(878), 13 W. Va. 278, the judgment
duty to enter on his docket the date
had been entered ji the State of
and tenor of the instrument on
New Jersey, under the laws of which
which the judgmuent is founded,
State it was valid and entitled to
which shall have the same force
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full force and credit, upon confession by authority of a warrant of
attorney executed by one of the
defendants. It was contended that
the Court should refuse to enforce
the judgment upon the ground,
interalia, that the defendant never
was notified in the cause in which
the judgment was confessed. In
holding the judgment valid and
binding upon the defendant, Judge
HAMMOND said: "It seems to me,
upon principle and authority, that
the first proposition [above mentioned] is untenable." After citing Randolpl v. Keilery (1855), 21
1,1o. 557, supra, and Mfills v.
Duryee, supra, he continued:
"Numerous decisions of State
courts, holding a judgment fairly
and regularly obtained in another
State, as full and conclusive evidence of the matter adjudicated,
have been made by numerous State
courts. * * The proceedings
and judgment in New Jersey in the
case at bar were, and are, unquestionably valid in the State of New
Jersey under the legislation of that
State, unless there be some defect
therein not yet considered."
In Brown v. Parker (1871), 28
Wis. 21, Bowen and Parker made
their promissory note, Parker signing it as surety only, together with
a warrant of attorney for the confession of judgment thereon, of
which note the plaintiff subsequently became the holder. At
the time of its execution, the parties
were all residents of and did business in Wisconsin, and all, except
Bowen, so remained until the commencement of the action on the
note. In the meantime, Bowen
had become a resident of Illinois.
The action was brought and judgment by confession taken and
entered in Illinois without service

on the defendants. In an action
on such judgment in Wisconsin,
the Court held that the warrant
conferred no authority to confess
judgment after the note was barred,
and that the defendant, Parker, was
entitled to avail, himself of such
defense. This was affirmed on
appeal, Chief Justice Dixox saying: "In determining the effect of
the judgment sued upon, how far
it may be re-examined, and what
relief, if any, may be granted
against it, we are to act and decide
precisely as the Court of Illinois
would do were the same questions
there presented. Judge SroRv, in
his examination of the subject as
to the effect of the records and
judicial proceedings of one State in
the courts of another under the
clause of the Constitution of the
United States, the Act of Congress,
and the decisions of the Supreme
Court, concludes by stating the
rule as follows. 'It gives them the
same faith and credit as they have
in the State Court from which they
ore taken. If in such court they
have the faith and credit of the
highest nature, that is to say of
record evidence, they must have
the same faith and credit in every
other Court. So that Congress have
declared the effect of the records,
by declaring what degree of faith
and credit shall be given to them.
If a judgment is conclusive in the
State where it is pronounced, it is
equally conclusive everywhere. If
re-examinable there, it is open to
the same inquiries in every other
State. It is, therefore, put upon
the same footing as a domestic
judgment': 2 Story on the Constitution,
1,313. This naturally
leads to the inquiry, how far the
judgment in question is open to
re-examination, and what relief
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could have been granted against it,
by the courts of Illinois, had application been made there, upon the
same facts set forth in the answer
here, and which were proved upon
the trial. The judgment was by
confession upon warrant of attorney. There was no other appearance or confession, or opportunity
of appeirance, than by the attorney
in pursuance of the warrant. It is
a general principle, prevailing in
nearly all the States as well as in

England, that the courts of law
exercise an equitable jurisdiction
over judgments thus entered, and
will, for cause shown, open, vacate
or modify them, and stay proceedings, or direct an issue and trial
upon the merits. Such is the rule
in this State, and, upon examination, we find it to have been fully
recognized and adopted by the
courts of Illinois."
ERNEST WATTS.

NOTES ON JUDGMENTS.-Ogdet v. Saunders Reviewed is the title of a
leadilig article by Conrad Reno in the October, 1888, AMERICAN LAW
REGISTER (Vol. XXVII, pages 611-26), in which the discussion in respect to the obligation of a contract, runs at once into the effect of ajudgment pleaded in a foreign jurisdiction, especially since the Fourteenth
Amendment has introduced into the courts of the United States a protective power over persons deprived of life, liberty and property without
due process of law.
Remediesfor the collection ofjudgments against debtors who are residents or property holders in anotherState, or within the British Dominions, is the title of a leading article by the Hon. Thomas M. Cooley, in
the November, x883, AMsERICAN L.kw REGISTER (Vol. XXII, pages 697711). This is a general treatment of the whole subject, which is minutely
examined with respect to confessed judgments only, by Mr. Watts.
Void and Voidable Judgments is the title of a leading article by FrederickJ. Brown, in the November, i88o, AMERICAN LAW REGISTER (Vol.
XIX, pages 673-90), wherein the discussion is led up to the enquiry whether
one of two defendants, duly summoned and cast in judgment, can object
to the want of service upon his co-defendant when the judgment is made
the foundation of an action in another jurisdiction. The solution is in
favor of the validity of the judgment: See Legal Xotes, in May, 1886,
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER (Vol. XXV, page 341).

The warning of the defendant in the judgment, afterwards and in
another jurisdiction made the foundation of an action, was discussed by
the Supreme Court of Michigan in McEwen v. Zimmer: 38 Mich. 765 ;
s. c. IS AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 92, and note, with the resulting de-

nial that even actual service upon the defendant, while absent from the
jurisdiction, could not be the foundation for a valid judgment. Such
"doctrine has no foundation in reason, or in the principles of international law or international comity." Hence the close scrutiny when the
judgment is entered by virtue of a warrant of attoruey.-ED.

